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Abstract 
Israel brands itself as a beacon of stability in a hostile and autocratic Middle East, with 
flourishing democratic values and equality for all as enumerated in its Proclamation of 
Independence. Why, then, despite its claim to be a liberal-Western democracy, did its parliament 
pass the Nation State Bill in July 2018? This thesis argues the passing of the Nation State Bill is 
the result of a historical tension over Israel's identity as both a Jewish and democratic state. 
Rather than seek answers based on contingent circumstances of the Arab-Israeli conflict, I argue 
attention must be paid to transformations within the judicial and legislative branches in the last 
30 years. Over that time, the Supreme Court of Israel capitalized on its growing power to assume 
the responsibility of judicial review, and thus, the power to overturn Knesset legislation which 
ran afoul with democratic values. Concurrently, right-wing political parties co-opted fears of 
national security to enter mainstream Israeli politics. The conservative Knesset has used its 
growing influence to counter the Supreme Court's encroachment by seeking ways to 
institutionalize its policy goals. The Nation State Bill is an attempt by right-wing politicians to 
shift Israel's identity towards Jewish values and away from democratic values as retribution 
against challenges led by an activist court, especially in the sphere of immigration and 
citizenship policies. Through an analysis of the historical trajectories of these two institutions, 
this thesis demonstrates how a multi-disciplined approach is required when assessing and 
predicting the impacts of legislative actions in Israel.  Title 
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Any love that is dependent on something, when that thing perishes, the love perishes. But a love 
that is not dependent on something, does not ever perish. 
Pirkei Avot 5:19 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Background 
In the morning hours of July 19th, 2018, in a 62-55 decision,1 the Israeli national parliament 
passed Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People, known informally and herein 
referred to as the "Nation State Bill." This highly controversial law proclaims Israel as the 
historic homeland of the Jewish people and grants Jews the unique right of national self-
determination in the country. It establishes Jewish symbols as those of the state, affirms a united 
and complete Jerusalem as Israel's capital, declares Israel's responsibility to serve as an 
"ingathering of the exiles," and seeks to strengthen its ties to the Jewish diaspora. By elevating 
the symbols, language, and religion of Jewish people, the Nation State Bill explicitly outlines a 
state-sponsored affinity for the Jewish ethno-religious group. By introducing sweeping decisions 
on controversial topics such as the status of Jerusalem, the bill also solidifies certain nationalist 
policies valued by Israel's right-wing politicians, which have been contested by the Supreme 
Court in recent history. Most importantly, by institutionalizing these values and ethnic 
preferences in the context of competing identities, the Nation State Bill represents a remarkably 
intense and sudden shift away from Israel's democratic character towards a nation with more 
robust Jewish values.  
Given Israel's decades-long campaign to portray itself as a beacon of stability in a so-
called virulent Middle East as well as the criticism of its occupation of Palestinian territories, the 
introduction of Nation State Bill created reason for concern for amongst both Israel's supporters 
and critics. According to Israeli scholar Baruch Kimmerling, Israel's government was established 
                                                   
1 The Knesset. (2018, July 19). Knesset passes Jewish nation-state bill into law [Press release]. Retrieved January 
24, 2019. 
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in 1948 as a result of free elections and universal suffrage. Israeli (primarily Jewish) citizens 
enjoy innumerable civil rights and liberties, resembling those of the most “perfect” liberal 
democracies in the Western world.2  Israel has continuously emphasized its democratic values in 
terms of portraying itself as the only democracy in the Middle East. For example, the country's 
relatively free press and freedom of expression has allowed Israel to cooperate with foreign 
media by conducting press conferences and sending out press releases3 about its technological 
innovations, considered symbols of free and creative thinking. But due to its competing identity 
as a Jewish state, as stipulated in its Proclamation of Independence, it has never been entirely 
clear which rights apply to Israeli non-Jewish minorities. Supporters of the bill dispute the idea 
that Jewish values and democratic values cannot co-exist in Israel, and point to a handful of 
democratic countries including Hungary, Germany, and Romania which have (or had) ethnically-
selective immigration and citizenship policies.4 Negative reactions from the bill generally 
express dismay at what detractors see as an erosion of Israel's democracy,5 although criticism has 
also veered towards the extreme and claimed that the law amounts to "apartheid."6  
Why, then, despite its claim to be a Western democracy and branding itself as such, did 
Israel pass the Nation State Bill in the summer of 2018? The bill's passage and resulting 
institutionalization of right-wing, nationalist ideals cannot be explained by mere contingent 
                                                   
2 Kimmerling, B. (1999). Religion, Nationalism, and Democracy in Israel. Constellations, 6(3), 339-363. 
doi:10.1111/1467-8675.00150 
3 Avraham, E. (2009). Marketing and managing nation branding during prolonged crisis: The case of Israel. Place 
Branding and Public Diplomacy, 5(3), 202-212. doi:10.1057/pb.2009.15 
4 For examples see: Dumbrava, C. (2016). Reproducing the nation: Reproduction, citizenship and ethno-
demographic survival in post-communist Romania. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 43(9), 1490-1507 and 
Joppke, C., & Rosenhek, Z. (2002). Contesting ethnic immigration: Germany and Israel compared. European 
Journal of Sociology, 43(3), 301-335. 
5 Israel's New Law Inflames the Core Tension in Its Identity. Retrieved March 1, 2019, from 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/07/israel-nation-state-law/565712/, and Lis, J., & Landau, 
N. (2018, July 19). 
6 Beaumont, P. (2018, July 19). EU leads criticism after Israel passes Jewish 'nation state' law. Retrieved March 27, 
2019, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/19/israel-adopts-controversial-jewish-nation-state-law 
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circumstance or by the intensification of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although I demonstrate 
how historical security concerns have played a role in the Nation State Bill's development, these 
concerns do not wholly explain why this bill was passed at this particular moment in time. Given 
Israel’s history of near-perpetual conflict with its neighbors, its security situation has remained 
volatile since its modern founding in 1948. 2018 was not characterized as a particularly intense 
year for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nor was it in the midst of any periods of protracted violence, 
such as Israel's declared wars, or the First and Second Intifadas. 
Rather, I explain the passing of the Nation State Bill as the culmination of the deep-
seated, historical tension over Israel's identity as both a Jewish and democratic state. More 
specifically, I argue that careful attention must be paid to transformations within the judicial and 
legislative branches in the last 30 years, marked by both the rise of judicial activism in the Israeli 
Supreme Court and the rise of mainstream right-wing politics in the Knesset, Israel's national 
parliament. The Nation State Bill is an attempt by right-wing politicians to pull the needle 
towards Jewish values and away from democratic values as retribution against democratic 
challenges led by an activist court, especially in the spheres of immigration and citizenship. 
I will first review three areas of relevant literature as they relate to the argument set forth 
by this thesis. I will then review the methodology for obtaining the evidence I use to support my 
argument. Finally, I will provide a roadmap by summarizing the succeeding chapters.   
 
Literature Review  
Characterizing Israel as Democratic versus Jewish 
Among scholars who discuss the characterization of Israel in the context of its Jewish and 
democratic identities, there is general consensus on the existence of a dichotomy between these 
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two sets of values. According to some scholars, the result of this tension comes in the form of 
unequal treatment regarding the rights of non-Jews in Israel and the rights bestowed de facto on 
Jews. Smooha uses Israel to exemplify a diminished type of democracy, according to his model, 
best referred to as an "ethnic' democracy." Countries in this category take ethnic nationalism, as 
opposed to the citizenry, to be the cornerstone of the state, meaning that rights are not extended 
equally to all citizens.7 For scholars like Smooha, Israel has a strong ethnic bias that forces a 
deviation from Western democratic values. Smooha’s conclusion is grounded firmly in his belief 
of a fundamental contradiction between Israel's egalitarian universalistic-democratic character 
and its inegalitarian Jewish-Zionist character.8 
The tension between these two characters extends particularly to Israel’s immigration and 
citizenship policies. Scholars point to laws such as the Law of Return, which guarantees the right 
of every Jew to immigrate to Israel, and the 2003 citizenship law, which singles out Arab groups, 
as evidence of state-sanctioned separation of Arab families. Proponents of the Law of Return 
argue that it was designed to right a historical wrong of worldwide Jewish persecution, and the 
Supreme Court of Israel asserts that the citizenship amendment stripping Palestinians of the 
opportunity to live in Israel was passed due to national security concerns.9 Opponents of these 
laws, however, see them as drawing discriminatory distinctions between Jews and Arabs, an 
unacceptable quality of a liberal democracy that supposedly treats all of its citizens equally and 
makes them members of a common civic nation.10  
                                                   
7 Smooha, S. (2002). The model of ethnic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic state 
8 Smooha. 495 
9 See Barak-Erez, D. (2007). Israel: Citizenship and immigration law in the vise of security, nationality, and human 
rights. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 6(1), 184-192. doi:10.1093/icon/mom036 
10 Smooha. 475 
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Not all scholars who discuss the characterization of Israel's institutions agree with the ethnic 
vs. civic state distinction. Christian Joppke explicitly argues against this analysis, calling it 
"misleading," because all nations have both an ethnic element defined by descent and origin, and 
a civic element defined by associations of strangers that transcend immediate kinship.11 Even if 
this distinction exists, according to Joppke, countries that would otherwise be classified as 
"ethnic" and "civic" have policies transcending their characterization. Those states generally 
considered "civic," like the United States and United Kingdom, heavily implemented policies at 
odds with pure liberalism throughout their respective histories, such as the 1921 national origin 
quota system in the US and the Aliens Act of 1905 in Britain.12 Moreover, countries considered 
"ethnic," such as Germany, have phased out open door policies aimed at encouraging co-ethnic 
immigration. Specifically, the "return" of ethnic Germans to Germany was a constitutional right 
enshrined in Article 116 of the Basic Law until a 1993 law limited the status of ethnic Germans 
to persons born before 1993.13 To Joppke, the religiously closed, non-territorial self-definition of 
the titular nation and the deep division of society demonstrates how Israel is a limited case of a 
liberal state.14 Joppke's argument is distinct from Smooha's, which fundamentally believes 
Israel's Jewish and democratic characteristics cannot co-exist. 
Kimmerling straddles both Smooha's and Joppke's assessments by arguing Judaism is built 
into Israeli nationality. As a result of what Kimmerling calls the "Zionist hegemony," Israel is 
not defined as state as belonging to its citizens, but to the entire Jewish people. His point is vital 
to the relationship between the right wing and Jewish diaspora, where the rise of an ultra-
                                                   
11 Joppke, C. (2005). Selecting by origin: Ethnic migration in the liberal state. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 17	
12 Girvan, A. (2018, June). The History of British Immigration Policy (1905-2016) (Rep.). Retrieved February 17, 
2019, from University of East Anglia website. 
13 Joppke, C., & Rosenhek, Z. (2002). Contesting ethnic immigration: Germany and Israel compared. European 
Journal of Sociology, 43(3), 301-335. doi:10.1017/s0003975602001121 
14 Joppke. 30 
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Orthodox, nationalist strand of politicians have facilitated the prominence of right-wing politics 
and reconfigured Israel's relationship to the Jewish diaspora. He also suggests, however, Western 
values contained in Israel's universal and secular codes do not necessarily stand in contradiction 
to the state's Jewish identity.15 Rather, any tension between the two sets of values are absorbed 
by the Zionist hegemony, the unchallengeable social order that exists because there are not even 
terms and concepts with which to characterize and question it. Kimmerling concludes from this 
phenomenon that the character of Israeli democracy is accepted by most measurements, but only 
within the framework of parameters fixed by the Zionist hegemony, a regime continuously 
fluctuating between democracy and nationalist-theocracy.16 
The classification of Israel's identity has been subject to scrutiny by scholars across various 
disciplines and using a variety of lenses, which obscure the comprehensive analysis needed to 
create more informed assessments of Israel's actions. Joppke classifies Israel as part of the 
"diaspora constellation," characterized by nations with the belief that their co-ethnics are 
stranded and oppressed outside of the home state,17 as opposed to the "settler state constellation" 
or "post colonial constellation." Kimmerling, on the other hand, considers Israel to be one of the 
"settler states," formed by a society of settler-immigrants and still an active settlement builder to 
this day.18 Despite the distinct reasoning the two scholars offer, they arrive at a similar 
conclusion about Israel's limited identity as a liberal democracy. Kimmerling, however, offers a 
more nuanced and complex view in his consideration of the way Israel's democracy is viewed by 
different groups. He suggests that Israel's democracy is seen differently by various people due to 
                                                   
15 Kimmerling. 340 
16 Kimmerling. 340-341 
17 Joppke. 30 
18 Kimmerling. 341 
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the Zionist hegemony and differing manners of consciousness, which represents the line of 
thinking I seek to capture.  
 
The Court System and its Relationship to the Legislature in Israel 
The Nation State Bill, which passed as a Basic Law meaning that it is constitutionally 
superior to statute laws, was perceived as a move to rebuke the court's growing role and so-called 
"judicial activism" in reversing the Knesset’s legislation. Studies use the court's role in 
legislation as an experiment of sorts on the relationship between judicial and legislative 
branches, especially in a country that enshrines both religious and democratic values within its 
institutions. Scholars debate the possibility of these two values co-existing, and their scholarship 
about tensions between the court and the Knesset often describe when religious and democratic 
values come into conflict. The core of the conflict between the Supreme Court of Israel and the 
Knesset are the values each branch purports to represent. Part of the divide between the 
legislature and judiciary stems from varying accounts about where the Supreme Court derives 
the power it holds today. During the "Constitutional Revolution" in the early to mid-1990s, the 
Supreme Court began to scrutinize Knesset legislation which putatively violates the 
constitutional-like Basic Laws, striking down laws deemed incompatible with them which 
essentially activated judicial review. 
Scholars have shown how the Supreme Court of Israel expresses its concern for upholding 
the democratic values, demonstrating that the "Constitutional Revolution" was a watershed 
moment for the Israeli legal system and constitutional politics. There exists disagreement, 
however, about the conditions influencing the court's decision to take a more active role in the 
legal system. David Kretzmer argues, in the absence of a formal bill of rights, the Supreme Court 
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filled a void in the protection of human rights,19 which is a responsibility a democratic nation 
should undertake. According to Edelman, the court is seen as a guardian of fundamental values 
embedded in an objective legal order.20 Rabin and Gutfel contend that the court, as an 
independent body with no constitutional text to rely upon, based its protection of human rights 
on references to principles derived from the democratic nature of the State, from its "national 
spirit" and from the "social consensus," all reflected in the State's Declaration of Independence 
and in the history of Israel and the Jewish people.21 The Supreme Court of Israel, in this sense, 
differs from that in other Western democracies from where it derives the power of judicial 
review, but it nonetheless remains a representation of democratic values to these scholars.  
Hirschl, however, proposes a different view. Rather than as the result of the court's decision 
to activate judicial review, he argues Israel's "constitutionalization" was the planned strategy of a 
ruling political elite made up of a relatively coherent social class of secular neoliberals of 
European origin with disproportionate access to the legal arena.22 He uses evidence from the 
Basic Laws, which include entrenchment clauses to protect them from being overturned, as 
mechanisms for these elites to insulate their policy preferences from popular political pressure23 
and maintain their authority against the growing power of "peripheral" groups.24  
Like Kimmerling, Hirschl evokes the "Zionist hegemony" when speaking about the 
respective tensions between democracy versus Judaism and legislature versus judiciary. The 
                                                   
19 Kretzmer, D. (1996). The New Basic Laws on Human Rights: A Mini-Revolution in Israeli Constitutional 
Law? Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 14(2), 173-183. doi:10.1177/092405199601400204 
20 Edelman, M. (1992). The Judicial Elite of Israel. International Political Science Review, 13(3), 235-248. 
doi:10.1177/019251219201300302	
21 Rabin and Gutfel (2014). Marbury v. Madison and Its Impact On Israeli Constitutional Law, 15 U. Miami Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 303 
22 Hirschl, R. (2000). The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization: Lessons from 
Four Constitutional Revolutions. Law & Social Inquiry, 25(01), 91-149. doi:10.1111/j.1747-4469.2000.tb00152.x 
23 Hirschl. 104	
24 Hirschl. Abstract 
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political power that a relatively small group of Ashkenazi Jews (who came from Europe) 
purportedly had in the 1980s and 1990s suggests that an expansion of the Supreme Court that 
was not as independent as Kretzmer claims, raising questions over the judicial branch's 
independence in the context of a nation which claims itself to be a full-fledged democracy with 
compatible Jewish values. Rather, the desire of Ashkenazi groups to defend their position against 
the growing power of fringe groups such as ultra-Orthodox and Russian immigrants reflects the 
fragmentation of Israeli politics seen during the election of 1996, which empowered the 
aforementioned formerly marginalized groups to make large gains in their political 
representation.  
Through his interdisciplinary analysis, Diskin demonstrates an awareness for the complex 
mechanisms influencing the dynamic Israeli electoral system. He emphasizes the 1996 election 
in his historical survey of Israel's institutional development, reaching across multiple dimensions 
of identity and politics to explain the underlying processes by which the electoral system 
changed. He attributes the election of 1996 to the fragmentation of the Israeli political system, 
which increased the number of parties gaining Knesset representation to a peak of 15.25 He 
highlights the national-ethnic-religious cleavages between Jewish and Arab voters as well as 
those within the Jewish population,26 distinguishing between Sephardi Jews (who came from 
Arab countries) and Ashkenazi Jews. Diskin draws on changing social, ethnic, and economic 
characteristics of Israeli society to demonstrate their effect on voter partisan affiliations. The 
multi-party system in the 1996 election derived from one of the court's first moves of judicial 
                                                   
25 Diskin, A. (1999). The New Political System of Israel. Government and Opposition, 34(04), 498-515. 
doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.1999.tb00167.x 
26 Diskin. 504 
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activism, when it elevated Basic Law: The Government to constitutional status following 
dissatisfaction with the conventional parliamentary system.  
 
The Role of the Court and Right-Wing Politics in Immigration and Citizenship Policy-Making 
Scholars have studied the roles that high courts and right-wing political groups have 
played in developing legislation, especially regarding citizenship and immigration. Studies 
contend that the real effects of radical right-wing politics occur largely as a result of the 
interaction between the radical right and established actors regardless of the radical right's 
assuming power in the parliamentary body. For example, Minkenberg characterizes the right-
wing in terms of its use of what I call political "camouflage," which allows it to make ideological 
and strategic adjustments to new cleavage and opportunity structures in the absence of an open 
hostility to liberal democracies and the softening of racist and authoritarian messages in terms of 
"ethnopluralis" and "ethnocratic" concepts of politics and society.27 Thus, in "stable 
democracies," the right-wing acts as a bridge between moderate conservatives and explicit anti-
democratic, violent right-wing extremists.28 Minkenberg largely speaks in terms of European 
powers and the countries in his case studies, namely Germany, France, Italy, and Austria, 
focusing on cultural policies. His analysis, however, can be extended to any countries with the 
conditions to allow for interactions between political actors, and the realm of immigration and 
citizenship policies.  
 For the radical right-wing in this context, a rise into mainstream politics enables an 
appropriation of the dominant concept of nation and nationhood. Waterbury explores the role of 
                                                   
27 Minkenberg, M. (2001). The radical right in public office: Agenda-setting and policy effects. West European 
Politics, 24(4), 1-21. doi:10.1080/01402380108425462 
28 Minkenberg. 3 
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right-wing politics in the legislation of a bill which reinforces the relationship between a nation 
and its diaspora in her analysis of the legislation of the “Status Law” in Hungary in 2006. The 
Status Law conferred special privileges on ethnic Hungarians living outside the physical borders 
of the nation. Waterbury argues right-wing elites in Hungary utilized and co-opted transnational 
ties with the Hungarian diaspora to make a rise into mainstream politics and further their own 
political goals, which enabled the passage of the bill.29 Dissatisfied with past silence from the 
Communist Party over the worsening situation of Hungarian ethnics in neighboring states, the 
right-wing FIDESZ party tapped into deeply held concerns about overcoming past injustices 
suffered by Hungary in an effort to re-construct its political ideology.30 Thus, according to 
Minkenberg's idea of "political camouflage," the FIDESZ party would be expected to use the 
diaspora issue as a means of shaping conservative policies, given the support for liberal 
democracy after the collapse of communism and a platform for racist messages.31 
In such cases where right-wing governments pass illiberal immigration and citizenship 
policies, are courts willing to override the legislative body on the ground that those policies 
violate the constitution? Scholarly works discussing supreme court interventions in legislation 
outline how the oft-contentious relationship between the judiciary and other political actors is 
central to courts' decisions. There are two schools of thought about this relationship. The first, to 
which Joppke subscribes in his 2001 analysis of European Court of Justice (ECJ) and German 
courts, emphasizes how justices make decisions relying exclusively on their individual 
ideological preferences and are unmoved by their fellow justices or other political actors.32 
                                                   
29 Waterbury, M. A. (2006). Internal Exclusion, External Inclusion: Diaspora Politics and Party-Building Strategies 
in Post-Communist Hungary. East European Politics and Societies: And Cultures, 20(3), 483-515. 
doi:10.1177/0888325405280897 
30 Waterbury. 493 
31 Minkenberg. 3	
32 Bergara, M., Richman, B. D., & Spiller, P. T. (2003). Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The 
Congressional Constraint. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.421520 
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Joppke outlines how the German Supreme Court had aggressively expanded the rights of non-
citizen labor migrants and their families during government indecision about terminating guest 
worker programs in the country.33 The court worked actively against the government's desire for 
no-immigrant policies, and broadly interpreted a "freedom of personality" clause in the German 
Basic Law to give aliens access to rights reserved for German citizens.  
The other school of thought contends that justices are strategic when formulating their 
actions and consider the potential reactions of their policy competitors (i.e. the other branches of 
government). Bergara et al. employs an established econometric model to analyze data on the 
impact of institutional constraints on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision making to conclude the 
U.S. Supreme Court justices do adjust their decisions to presidential and congressional 
preferences. An implication of this finding inhibits justices from passing down a decision that 
would be overturned by an act of Congress if Congress replaced the decision with a policy that, 
in the view of a majority of the court, led to an inferior outcome.34 A limitation to this field of 
thought is that it does not incorporate the dynamics between judiciaries and legislatures in other 
countries, but the general relationship will be useful when exploring the nuances of the conflict 
between the Supreme Court and the Knesset. 
 Scholars also discuss the role that public opinion plays as a factor in the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Israel. Barnum's study of the relationship between the policy preferences of 
the U.S. Supreme Court and those of public preference yielded the conclusion that the court's 
decisions in overturning legislation were often supported by the distribution or the trend of 
                                                   
33 Joppke, C. (2001). The Legal-Domestic Sources of Immigrant Rights. Comparative Political Studies,34(4), 339-
366. doi:10.1177/0010414001034004001 
34 Bergara, et. al. 249 
13 
 
nationwide public opinion.35 When such support was lacking, the court seemed reluctant to act. 
His analysis offers deeper insights into the characterization of the U.S. Supreme Court, post-New 
Deal, as a "counter-majoritive activist" in which unelected judges use the power of judicial 
review to nullify the actions of elected executives or legislators, acting contrary to “majority 
will.”  
There are two ways, according to Barnum, to resolve this tension between judicial review 
and majoritarian principles. One is to assert majoritarian principles that do not exhaust the 
controlling tenants of democracy, which allows for some policy decisions to be made by an 
institution relatively insulated from political pressure. In his analysis of the EU, Joppke argues 
the ECJ used its "hermeneutic monopoly" on interpreting EU treaties to expand the concept of a 
worker and the rights attached to it in as broad terms as possible.36 Although Joppke concedes 
there is legal space for the ECJ to apply the doctrine of implied powers to citizenship and 
nationality policies, he argues that the court contradicted the interests of EU members states by 
turning demand-induced migration into supply-induced migration.37 Thus, although there might 
be legal space for an independent institution to legislate, the ECJ demonstrated how courts can 
also act against the interests of constituents.  
The second way to resolve the tension of majoritarian principles is to establish that the 
supreme court does not often render counter-majoritarian policy decisions.38 Dahl finds instead 
that policy outputs of the court were likely to conform to the policy preferences of the dominant 
coalition in national politics in the long run.39 The research I put forth confirms that Supreme 
                                                   
35 Barnum, D. G. (1985). The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision Making in the Post- New Deal 
Period. The Journal of Politics, 47(2), 652-666. doi:10.2307/2130901 
36 Joppke. 354 
37 Joppke. 355 
38 Barnum. 653 
39 Dahl, R. A. (1957). Decision-Making in a Democracy. Role of the Supreme Court Symposium, 1, 279-295. 
doi:10.4324/9781315095455-8 
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Court of Israel infrequently rules on counter-majoritarian principles, but the significance of those 
decisions, which did run contrary to the dominant right-wing coalition, have contributed to the 
combative relationship we observe today between the court and the Knesset. The lack of 
attention paid to the significance of these legal departures in the literature signal a need to 
analyze the dynamics of the events when discussing the role of the court and right-wing political 
groups in legislating policies.  
 
Limitations of the Literature and My Contributions 
 The scholarship in these fields offer narrow and deep explanations of how Israel's key 
issues and institutions impact its national identity. No body of work, however, attempts to map 
and integrate their historical trajectories to explain the passage of legislation. The idea of 
explaining the passing of a law, especially one as consequential as the Nation State Bill, can help 
identify underlying mechanisms that shape a nation's identity. Due to the myriad of political, 
legal, and social forces at work in democratic legislatures when passing a law, accounting for 
these forces is vital when evaluating the Nation State Bill. The comprehensive analysis offered 
by this paper highlights the nuances of the Nation State Bill and the impact it has on a deeply 
divided Israeli society with an ambiguous Jewish identity.  
Moreover, although scholars attest to the independence of the Supreme Court of Israel’s 
actions during the "Constitutional Revolution," none have extended their analysis beyond the 
political implications of the revolution or the few years immediately following. Because of this 
lapse in the literature, there remains an opportunity for empirical analysis of the ramifications of 
the court's judicial review power. Despite the "soft legal principles" Kretzmer discusses, which 
he argued had minimal influence on the Knesset's actions, the Supreme Court has engaged itself 
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in a form of judicial activism that has intervened in several cases involving Knesset laws. These 
laws have dealt with controversial topics, including citizenship rights for Palestinians and the 
treatment of African asylum seekers in internment camps. The result has widened the divisions 
between the judicial branch and the legislative branch as they clash on who has the authority to 
decide the identity of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. This paper seeks to break down, 
analyze, and shed light on the role of these tensions and in the passage of the Nation State Bill. 
 
Methodology 
I relied on political science, legal, and sociological scholarship from secondary sources to 
conduct a historical analysis of the key issues and institutions that shaped the development of the 
Nation State Bill. Given the recent passage of the bill, I use diverse sources of news coverage 
from publications across the political ideological spectrum to situate scholarly evidence on legal 
and political systems into the Israeli context. Scholarship highlights how public opinion plays an 
especially vital role in shaping legislation and the decisions of the Supreme Court of Israel, so I 
use newspaper articles from domestic Israeli sources as well as international publications to 
supplement my analysis with voices from the public. I chose articles which presented supportive, 
dissenting, and ambiguous opinions on the Nation State Bill by using keyword Google searches 
including "Nation State Bill racist" and "Nation State Bill support." The diverse array of news 
sources reflects the nuances I seeks to capture, including highlighting the tensions that exist 
between Israel's democratic and Jewish identities. News articles are written to assess opinions at 
a moment in time. I therefore use multiple news outlets at various points. Moreover, I will 
examine the result of surveys carried out to gauge public opinion about African asylum seekers 
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and relations with Palestinians, as these issues are closely connected to the conflict between the 
Supreme Court and right-wing government.  
 
Chapter Organization 
The following chapters lay out the key issues and tensions contained in the Nation State Bill, 
and analyze the trajectories of two institutions centered around these debates. Chapter 2 will 
situate my argument within the historical tension between Jewish and democratic values as well 
as the tension undercutting the relationship between Israel and the Jewish diaspora. What makes 
these debates important is the division between the Supreme Court of Israel and the right-wing 
political establishment, as they subscribe to opposing views with respect to citizenship and 
immigration. It will discuss how these issues have appeared before the court, analyze the impacts 
of the decisions reached, and demonstrate how the direction each institution swung deepened the 
intensification of the conflict between the legislature and the judiciary.  
Chapter 3 will present the significance of the Supreme Court's influence on these main issues 
and tensions by surveying the trajectory of its development throughout Israeli history. I argue the 
Supreme Court could not have played such a large role in the conflict with the legislature and the 
development of the Nation State Bill without several critical events occurring in the 1990s which 
would allow the court to assume the power of judicial review. The court intervened in several 
significant cases involving decisions driven by democratic values, such as the treatment of 
African asylum-seekers, which opposed conservative politicians' more nationalistic views. Thus, 
the debate between the court and the Knesset has brought up a question about the balance of 
powers between the two branches in the context of legislating and ruling on substantial issues.  
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 Chapter 4 analyzes the trajectory of right-wing politics in Israel from its first ascent to the 
premiership in 1977 through the present day. I argue the actions of right-wing politicians, 
particularly their passing of the Nation State Bill, have been responses to the growing influence 
of the Supreme Court of Israel. Conservative politicians have sought to institutionalize their 
policies more firmly to safeguard them from an "intruding" court. I will provide evidence that 
this type of intervention was possible due to a series of events leading to their inclusion into 
mainstream Israeli politics. Given the high-profile nature of the tensions and issues placed in 
front of the court and its respective decisions, the question of which branch has the power to 
control legislation then emerged, which had enormous implication for Israel's identity as a 
Jewish or democratic state. 
 The final chapter reiterates the argument that the Nation State Bill was forged by 
retribution from the Israeli right-wing political establishment to inhibit the Supreme Court's 
democratic challenge. The trajectories of both of these institutions allowed each to procure the 
power to shape key issues, and the Nation State Bill constituted the critical conjuncture at which 
these development paths collided. The chapter then highlights reactions over the bill following 
its passage and discusses the Nation State Bill's future effects by focusing on a movement by 
contemporary conservatives to overturn court's rulings on several key decisions. I conclude with 
a discussion about the importance of considering issues surrounding Israel with a more nuanced 
perspective for the forces shaping its most significant developments. 
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Chapter 2: Setting Up the Issues 
Introduction 
The culmination of nearly two decades of political debate over Israel's Jewish and democratic 
identities, the Nation State Bill received substantial criticism upon its passage from various 
political, religious, and ethnic groups both in Israel and throughout the world.40 Some of the most 
divisive aspects of the bill include sweeping proclamations affirming Israel as the national home 
of Jewish people, and asserting the exclusive Jewish right to national self-determination in Israel. 
Furthermore, the bill reiterates Israel's mission to ensure the safety of all Jews worldwide; to 
strengthen its relationship with the diaspora; and to preserve the cultural, historical, and religious 
heritage among Jews in the diaspora.41  
What are the underling tensions existing in Israel that drove the passage of the Nation State 
Bill? How did these tensions manifest in court, and what were the implications of the court's 
decisions for the conflict between the judiciary and legislature? This chapter places my argument 
within the context of the historical tension between Jewish and democratic values, as well as the 
tension over the proper relationship between Israel and the Jewish diaspora. I argue the 
manifestations of these tensions can be seen within the divisions between the Supreme Court and 
right wing politicians, who take opposing stances on whether to use Jewish or democratic values 
when ruling on legislation regarding immigration and citizenship. Debates on the correct degree 
                                                   
40 For examples of criticism, see: Liebermann, O. (2018, July 19). Israel passes controversial 'nation-state' bill into 
law. Retrieved March 1, 2019, from https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/19/middleeast/israel-nation-state-legislation-
intl/index.html, Green, E. (2018, July 21). Israel's New Law Inflames the Core Tension in Its Identity. Retrieved 
March 1, 2019, from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/07/israel-nation-state-law/565712/, and 
Lis, J., & Landau, N. (2018, July 19). Israel passes controversial Jewish nation-state bill after stormy debate. 
Retrieved March 1, 2019, from https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-passes-controversial-nation-state-bill-
1.6291048 
41 Israel, Knesset. (2018). Basic Law: Israel- The Nation State of the Jewish People. Jerusalem.	
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of Israel's relations with the Jewish diaspora have resurrected the question of who is included in 
the Jewish population, an issue the right wing has sought to safeguard from the activist court 
within the Nation State Bill. 
The first section of the chapter will discuss the tension that exists between Jewish and 
democratic values in Israel. It recounts some steps the Israeli government has taken to promote 
Jewish ideas over democratic ones, and analyzes a supreme court case regarding non-citizen 
rights which highlights the differing views between the judicial and legislative branch. The 
chapter then moves to discuss tension over how Israel should treat the Jewish diaspora and 
preferential immigration policies contingent on identifying as a Jew. I conclude this chapter by 
examining two cases which demonstrate the contested Jewish identity and the starkly different 
outcomes which can occur depending on a variety of circumstances including political climate, 
economic needs, and race.   
 
The Tensions Between Jewish and Democratic Values 
Background  
Following the end of the Six Day War in June 1967, the Israeli government sought ways 
to capitalize on support from the Jewish diaspora and imbue them to make aliyah in the vise of 
its unique security situation and perceived need for a "demographic boost." After the upheaval of 
the center-left government in 1977 by a right-wing coalition, over 250 Jewish settlements were 
constructed until it became clear that there were insufficient numbers of Jews to adequately 
populate all of these settlements .42 The lack of Jews to live in these settlements stemmed from 
fears for personal security of Israel, as the 1980’s were a time of increased Arab terror acts 
                                                   
42 Soffer, A. (1989). Demography and the shaping of Israel’s borders. Contemporary Jewry, 10(2), 91-105. 
doi:10.1007/bf02965574 
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against Israel.43 The sentiment among Jews worldwide was that there was no way of overcoming 
the Arab masses on the "other side," in Judea and Samaria (which constitute the West Bank), and 
the Gaza Strip.44 Thus, the government pursued ways to reconcile its immigration policies with 
the security fears plaguing its efforts to achieve steady Jewish settlement in Israel. 
Israel's complicated geopolitical history, doubts about the sovereignty over its borders, 
and its security situation, have given rise to the salience of its "illiberal" immigration policies 
which separate the nation from other Western democracies, and the government's emphasis on 
the physical aspect of aliyah. Fitzgerald explains how, throughout the early 20th century, the U.S. 
and Argentina ethnicized Eastern Europeans and restricted their entry due to fears of anarchists, 
Communists, and other radicals.45 As nation-states developed, however, these security concerns 
faded until the two world wars when enemy aliens were typically excluded. Since Israel has 
consistently had to worry about its security given its volatile history, these concerns are still 
present and corroborate its motives of using immigration and emigration as policy tools. Policies 
including the Law of Return, which stipulates the right of any Jew to immigrate to Israel and 
gain citizenship, have been amended several times by the Supreme Court of Israel, against the 
wishes of right-wing political establishment. 
Israel’s ethnically-selective laws have undergone adjustments based on its changing 
security and ethnographic needs. The Law of Return was revised several times to reflect the 
growing need for Jewish immigration, but is unique among ethnically-selective policies in other 
countries because of its requirement for the physical movement of co-ethnics to the kin state. 
Although the Law of Return bestows recognition of ethno-cultural membership on Jews who do 
                                                   
43 Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013). 1967-1993: Major Terror Attacks 
44 Soffer. 96	
45 FitzGerald, D. S., & Cook-Martín, D. A. (2014). Culling the masses: The democratic origins of racist immigration 
policy in the Americas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
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not possess the formal status of citizenship, it does not grant symbolic recognition nor give the 
same series of "quasi-benefits" to co-ethnics,46 regardless of citizenship status, conferred by co-
ethnics of Central and Eastern European countries. Rather, the requirement of formal movement 
of the Jewish diaspora to Israel is a vehicle of the state to serve its goal of building up and 
maintaining a Jewish majority within its boundaries.  
Scholars use these policies to characterize Israel as an "ethnic" or "illiberal" democracy, 
highlight the extent to which the state uses national security to implement such policies to 
encourage immigration amongst the Jewish diaspora. Although the Israeli government does not 
recognize them as such, a common justification for the illiberal policies comes from the fear that 
the immigration of non-Jews will lead to a demographic crisis of the loss of the Jewish majority 
in Israel. This phenomena, pertinent to Israel due to its conflict between religious and democratic 
values, demonstrates the inextricable link between Jewish immigration and ethnic nationhood -- 
the crux of the Nation State Bill. Like the "pioneering" sentiment felt by Jews following Israel's 
victory in the Six-Day War, the full significance of Jewish immigration derives from a 
geopolitical environment in which demography is destiny.47  
 
Tzaim v. Prime Minister (2018) 
 The case of Tzaim v. Prime Minister exhibits how tensions between Israel's democratic 
and Jewish values have unfolded within the sphere of illiberal citizenship and immigration 
policies. The Supreme Court's decision ultimately rejected the right-wing government's stance, 
exemplifying the conflict over which values should prevail. In the case, five Palestinian women 
                                                   
46 Dumbrava, C. (2018). The ethno-demographic impact of co-ethnic citizenship in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 1-17. doi:10.1080/1369183x.2018.1440490 
47 Joppke & Rosenhek. 306	
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living with cancer in the Gaza Strip were originally denied entry into Israel to pass through to 
reach East Jerusalem, part of the occupied West Bank, to receive treatment. The state denied the 
women on grounds that they were first degree relatives of Hamas members, part of a 
government-instituted policy preventing family members of Hamas over the age 16 from 
entering Israel for any reason.48 The law was instituted as part of Israel’s attempt to pressure 
Hamas into returning the bodies of two Israeli soldiers from Operation Defensive Shield in 2014, 
as well as two Israelis who entered the Gaza Strip after the operation, and are believed to be held 
by the group.49 
The appeals from the Palestinian women versus the argument from Israel's government 
reflect the boundary between democratic and Jewish values. The five women, along with several 
Israeli, Arab, and Palestinian human rights groups petitioned the Supreme Court to overturn their 
decisions on the grounds that they were arbitrary, unreasonable, disproportionate, and deviated 
from international humanitarian norms. The state argued Israel has a lack of legal responsibility 
to Gaza residents since then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon unilaterally retreated from Jewish 
settlements in the Gaza Strip in 2005 at the insistence of Gazans and the international 
community, and therefore has the right to refuse entry to Gaza residents unless in "exceptional 
humanitarian circumstances." More broadly, the state argued Israel has discretion over who 
enters the territory it governs, and no foreigner has a right to enter the country or pass through 
even for medical treatment.50 As Hamas stands for threatening the elimination of Israel51 and 
                                                   
48 Hostovsky Brandes, T., & Shafran Gittleman, I. (2018, September 24). The Israeli Supreme Court's Decision in 
Tziam v. the Prime Minister. Retrieved April 2, 2019, from https://www.lawfareblog.com/israeli-supreme-courts-
decision-tziam-v-prime-minister 
49 Times of Israel Staff. (2018, August 27). Court rules state must allow Hamas relatives into Israel for cancer 
treatment. Retrieved April 2, 2019, from https://www.timesofisrael.com/court-rules-state-must-allow-hamas-
relatives-into-israel-for-cancer-treatment/ 
50 Hostovsky and Shaffran 
51 The Charter of Hamas art. 28, para. 2.	
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Jewish values, Israel's ban on its relatives from entering the country exhibits the state's focus on 
protecting and preserving these Jewish values. 
The Supreme Court's decision to demand that the state give the women permission to 
pass through Israel reflects a stronger commitment to democratic values compared with the right-
wing government establishment, whose commitment was more in line with Israel’s Jewish 
values. According to the court, Israel is bound by criteria for accepting and rejecting requests 
based on legitimate considerations in line with the state's basic constitutional ethics. The 
recognition and preservation of life, even that of an enemy alien, are part of Israel's values "as a 
democratic and Jewish state." Further, the policy was incompatible with the value of individual 
responsibility, which prohibits punishing individuals for the actions of others, such as immediate 
family members, and the ban did not allow for what the court believed to be a system of case-by-
case examination. Although the Supreme Court did not strike down the entire policy of restricted 
access for Gaza residents, its decision based on the state's respect for all life drew upon its 
democratic values. The roots of the court's interpretation of Israel's 'basic values' come from the 
"Constitutional Revolution" in the early and mid-1990s, a topic discussed at length in Chapter 3 
which gave the court broad new powers to interpret Israel's constitutional laws.  
The reaction from right-wing Knesset members highlights the disparity between the 
state's and Supreme Court's priorities for Israel's identity. Knesset member Betzalel Smotrich 
from the conservative Jewish Home Party tweeted soon after the court's decision that the ruling 
demonstrated a “lack of responsibility shown by judges for the state’s security." He also drew on 
the commonly-held right-wing notion that the court was participating in “activism on steroids 
with no legal basis,”52 alluding to previous criticism for overturning legislation passed by the 
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Knesset on the basis of democratic values versus Jewish ones. Despite the court's order to 
consider each request for medical treatment on a case-by-case basis, the state continued to 
systematically uphold the ban on Gaza residents on virtually all grounds. According to Haaretz, 
Israel has denied requests from potential Palestinian patients because they had relatives who 
moved to areas of the West Bank controlled by the Palestinian Authority (PA) without Israeli 
permission.53 Although the government has stated that it reserves the right to decide which and 
how many Gazans can move to the West Bank, this judgment violates the Oslo Accords- which 
recognize Gaza and the West Bank as one territory. As Chapter 4 explores the ascent of right-
wing politics, Prime Minister Netanyahu rose to prominence on criticism of the Oslo Accords 
being "too soft" on the Palestinians. This tension between the court and the legislature serves as 
the basis for the creation of the Nation State Bill, and manifests in other cases and tensions as 
well. 
 
The Tension Between Israel and Its Diaspora  
Background 
Within the trans-border Jewish community, including Israeli Jews and the greater Jewish 
population across the world, lies a deep-seated tension about Israel's national identity and its 
responsibility to the Jewish diaspora versus its obligations as a liberal democracy. The 
relationship between these two groups is enshrined in Israel's Proclamation of Independence, 
where the county's founders wrote an appeal "to the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora to 
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rally round the Jews of Eretz-Israel in the tasks of immigration and up-building and to stand by 
them in the great struggle for the realization of the age-old dream - the redemption of Israel."54  
 The relationship between Israel and the Jewish diaspora, however, is not predetermined. 
The Proclamation of Independence states the existence of this relationship, but does not go any 
further in explaining the specific contours of the interactions between the state and its co-ethnics. 
Israel's stated purpose is to serve as the homeland for a specific ethnic group, and members of 
that ethnic nation and diaspora are preferred to non-members, who are seen as outsiders and less 
desirable persons who therefore cannot be full members of the society and state.55 The disparity 
in treatment of ethnic Jews and non-Jews is widely apparent in Israel56 and has historical roots. 
The difference in treatment has resulted in starkly depleted social outcomes and economic 
opportunities, such as in housing and in the labor market, for non-Jewish groups.57 Most recent 
in the line of institutionalized preferences is the Nation State Bill, which confers and reaffirms 
sole Jewish rights to national self-determination in Israel and promotes the establishment of 
Jewish settlements. The bill devotes an entire section to Israel's connection with the Jewish 
people, specifying that the state shall act within the diaspora to strengthen the affinity between 
the state and members of the Jewish people.58  
Although ambiguity exists regarding the exact relationship between Israel and the Jewish 
diaspora, it is far from the only case where the relationship between the kin state and its diaspora 
have been institutionalized and contested. Joppke and Rosenhek compare the Jewish affinity for 
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Israel as its homeland with the affinity that ethnic Germans have for Germany, as ethnic 
Germans are also believed to be identical with the state-bearing nation.59 The right of return for 
ethnic Germans was a constitutional right, designed as a temporary remedy for ethnic Germans 
in the Soviet Union deemed by the government to be persecuted for their ethnicity from the 
consequences of war. Despite the law, a struggle in Germany occurred over whether an ethnic or 
civic definition of German nationhood should take precedence, with a strengthening of the civic 
definition over time60 and the resulting demise of the German Law of Return in 1993. In contrast 
to Israel's migration-focused approach, Waterbury discusses Hungary's passage of the far-
reaching "Status Law," which grants special benefits and subsidies to millions of ethnic 
Hungarians living in neighboring countries.61 Similar to Israel, Hungary’s relationship to its 
diaspora has been an important feature of both domestic politics and foreign policy, but has been 
contested (to various degrees) throughout the changing priorities of each Hungarian 
administration.62 Diaspora relations play a significant role in the trajectory of the kin state's 
policies, which have consequences for both members and non-members of the ethnic state. 
 
Jewish Membership Case Studies 
The contested idea of who constitutes a Jew, a topic addressed by the Nation State Bill 
which draws a hard distinction between Jews and non-Jews, has also manifested in previous 
cases throughout Israeli history. Concurrent with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, large influxes of Russian immigrants made their way to Israel under the 
Law of Return despite their un-halachic recognition as Jews. This period also saw the emergence 
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of a group of Ethiopian Jews who were left behind by an Israeli airlift operation. Their status as 
Jews was dubiously recognized by the government, which created conflict over the state's 
responsibility to them. These two cases encapsulate the tension over Jewish, further complicating 
Israel's relationship with the diaspora and the Nation State Bill. 
 
Soviet 'Jewish' Immigration  
 The mass immigration of "Jews" from the former Soviet Union represented one of the 
first times in Israel's history where religious and right-wing political groups were willing to 
overlook the halachic definition of a Jew, determined by Halacha (Jewish law). The origins of 
Israel's acceptance of these Russian immigrants came from its geopolitical struggle during the 
First Intifada.63 Increased violence during the Palestinian uprising resulted in heightened requests 
from Israeli businesses for foreign workers, at the same time that the government sought to 
decrease its reliance on Palestinian labor. Since the 1960s, Palestinian labor had been more 
frequently used for low-skilled jobs in Israel in sectors such as construction, agriculture, and 
services.64 Then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin believed the "separation" of Israeli and 
Palestinian people was the way to peace, meaning the importation of foreign labor became a 
temporary measure to give the country time to reconstruct the economy and free itself from 
dependence on cheap labor from the Palestinian territories.65 The government's desire, along 
with the timely collapse of the Soviet Union and succeeding outflow of Russians from the 
country, laid the groundwork for an increasingly blurred definition of Jewish identity, and 
exposed underlying motivations for Israel's "illiberal" immigration policies.   
                                                   
63 Lustick, I. S. (1999). Israel as a Non-Arab State: The Political Implications of Mass Immigration of Non-
Jews. Middle East Journal, 53(3), 417-433. Retrieved February 7, 2019. 
64 Bartram, D. V. (1998). Foreign Workers in Israel: History and Theory. International Migration Review, 32(2), 
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 Russian immigrants' status as Jews, demonstrated Israel's willingness to rebuke the status 
quo of Jewish identity to build and maintain a "Jewish" majority against a perceived rising Arab 
influence in the country. Looking at Western Europe's history of importing foreign labor and the 
tendency of these "temporary" workers to settle permanently in the host country, government 
ministers wanted to avoid a similar situation in Israel. They believed adding large numbers of 
non-Jews would make the country suffer in terms of its ethnic dimension,66 a complicated issue 
already heavily contested. Especially during a time of high levels of Jewish emigration, low 
levels of Jewish immigration, and diminishing Jewish rates of natural increase relative to Arab 
rates, an Arab majority within the administrative and political jurisdiction of Israel appeared 
imminent67 to government actors.  
 The Law of Return allowed for preferential immigration of Russians to Israel due to the 
broader criteria established by the amendment. Primarily, traditional criteria stipulates one is a 
Jew only if his/her mother is Jewish.68 According to updated Law of Return, however, the right 
to immigrate extended to include the children and grandchildren of a Jew, the spouse of a child 
of a Jew and the spouse of the grandchild of a Jew. The purpose was to ensure the unity of 
families where intermarriage had occurred,69 which is against the Orthodox interpretation of 
Jewish identity. According to the law then, it became possible for dozens of people in any one 
family who have never considered themselves Jewish and who would not be considered Jewish 
upon arrival in Israel to qualify for Israeli residence and citizenship.70  
The allowance of these Russian immigrants accomplished both Israel's short- and long-
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term goal of bolstering the domestic Jewish population despite the departure from a strict 
Orthodox interpretation of a Jew. According to Dumbrava, ethno-nationally sensitive migration 
and citizenship policies (such as the Law of Return) can reduce the need to rely on non-ethnic 
immigrants to fill labor shortages, and they can also contribute to the re-adjustment of the ethnic 
structure of the population.71 This case of Russian immigration illustrates both of Dumbrava's 
points, ultimately contributing to the formal reproduction of the preferred ethnic group's 
population, on the basis that these immigrants could still contribute to the demographic 
consolidation of the Jewish state.72 In the short term, the Israeli government sought to create 
employment for the new Russian immigrants, out of fear that they would leave for the United 
States rather than seek employment in Israel. This would be seen as a failure of Zionism- thus the 
government anxiously tried to prevent it by making it something of a national mission to replace 
Palestinian workers with Russian Jews, who were mostly highly educated.73 This case also 
illustrates an implicit long-term goal of the Law of Return, which is to construct and maintain a 
Jewish majority against non-ethnically Jewish influences. The law was not designed to ward off 
unwanted immigrants, but encourage desired immigrants.74 Israel demonstrated its commitment 
to ensuring that its mission of serving as the Jewish homeland was preserved, even if it had to 
adjust the definition of a Jew's identity to do so.  
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The Falash Mura 
The case of the Falash Mura demonstrates the salience of a contested Jewish identity that 
cuts through a racial dimension and emphasizes preference for certain traits over others within 
the preferred ethnic group. These Ethiopian nationals constitute groups left behind following the 
1991 airlift of over 14,000 Falash (Ethiopian) Jews to Israel because they were designated by the 
Israeli government as descendants of converts75 and therefore not authentic Jews. The Falash 
Mura have long claimed to be part of the Beta Israel community of Ethiopian Jews, whose 
ancestors converted to Christianity but whose descendants today clamor for their right to "return 
to Judaism" in the context of a mass migration to Israel. Their case, however, is considered by 
the state in a different light than that of Russian immigrants, despite their comparable non-Jewish 
background. Whether the Law of Return should apply to a group of dark-skinned Ethiopians 
believed to have Jewish ancestry, yet descended from Christian converts, has provoked enduring 
dispute about the definition of a Jew, particularly because the Falash Mura allegedly had ample 
reasons to want to leave a war-torn Ethiopia other than desiring to “return to Judaism.”76  
The dynamics of the Falash Mura case, categorized by a combination of bureaucratic, 
religious, ethnographic, and historical accounts of agency,77 have resulted in a system of 
conflicting criteria for "Jewishness" by which these immigrants are judged. Seeman documents 
the "rituals of domination" that immigrating Falash Mura have been subject to during the 
conversion process. Such rituals include a symbolic circumcision in public to the shaming gaze 
of outsiders, as well as formal and informal scrutiny in daily life at the immigrant center vis-à-vis 
the authenticity of their religious practice. Comparing the Falash Mura's plight to the relative 
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ease that white Russian immigrants had immigrating to Israel, this dynamic highlights the latent 
factor of racial preference over the tension of Jewish belonging. 
By comparing the Falash Mura's predicament when attempting to emigrate to Israel to 
that of the Russian immigrants, we observe the value Israel places on certain traits, such as race, 
within the Jewish community when encouraging ethnic immigration. Although both Russian and 
Falash Mura immigrants are required to undergo state-regulated religious conversions before 
enjoying equal rights and civil recognition as "untainted" Jewish immigrants,78 Russians were 
not questioned about the sincerity of their commitment to Judaism or on their desire to leave 
their home country. The Falash Mura, on the contrary, had to show their desire for immigrating 
to Israel was not be predicated on their desire to leave Ethiopia.79 Further, they had to 
demonstrate a sincere "return" to the religion of their ancestors by going through these "rituals of 
domination" and subjecting themselves to profound distrust of their commitment to Judaism. 
Through these rituals, Falash Mura immigrants have learned that their submission might never be 
pronounced "enough"80 in the eyes of political elites or parts of the general Israeli public.  
 
Key Findings 
In the context of Israel's immigration policies that are skewed in favor of Jews, there 
exists tension among the Jewish diaspora and the state about the definition of a Jew. But as 
exhibited by the empirical effects of these policies that pre-suppose the identity of a Jew, more 
co-ethnics are created rather the pre-existing ethnic community being built up. There also exists 
tension over the traits of Jews that are valued over others by the state. The case of the Russian 
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immigrants illustrates a time where religious and right-wing parties were willing to forgo their 
strict definition of a Jew to continue Jewish immigration.  
Certain political, economic, and racial contexts are also at play, however, when it comes 
to determining the ease to which diaspora Jews can enter. Originally left out of the Ethiopian-
Jewish migration in 1991, the Falash Mura have been subject to extreme scrutiny and suspicion 
from Israelis over their commitment to Judaism, even subjecting themselves to harsh conditions 
once arriving to prove their "worthiness." Such immigration policies highlight and perpetuate 
ideas reflected in the Nation State Bill that characterize Israel's efforts to construct its national 
identity as a Jewish state, even at the expense of the diaspora it was created to serve.   
 
Conclusion 
A host of issues within Israel's boundaries perpetuated a series of tensions that have sown 
conflict between the judicial branch and legislative branch. Israel's complex geopolitical history 
with its neighbors, coupled with national security concerns and a preoccupation with maintaining 
a Jewish demographic majority, led to debates over whether Jewish or democratic values should 
be favored in the public sphere. The court, a bulwark for democratic values, has frequently 
clashed over a series of illiberal immigration and citizenship policies imposed by the nationalist, 
right-wing legislature. The case of the Palestinian women seeking medical treatment highlights 
the ramifications of policies aimed at protecting the Jewish identity of Israel, with the blanket 
ban on Gaza residents underscoring the suffering of democratic values to impose such a policy. 
Although the idea of a strong bond between Israel and the Jewish diaspora lays within its 
Declaration of Independence, conflict between the Supreme Court of Israel and Knesset has 
implicated the question of Jewish identity itself. Analysis of two cases of recent Jewish 
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immigration to Israel en masse demonstrates the various dimensions along which Israel has 
adjusted the legal definition of a Jew to fit its present circumstances. This dynamic is 
complicated by the right-wing government's attempts to institutionalize its own nationalist and 
Jewish-centered policies against intervention from the court. Tension between Jewish and 
democratic values, as well as tension over Israel's relationship with the Jewish diaspora, became 
the public issues over which the legislature and judiciary would use their increasing power in 
their attempts to mold Israel's identity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Chapter 3: The Supreme Court of Israel and Judicial Activism 
Background 
The increasing power of the Supreme Court over the past 20 years led to an intense power 
struggle between the judiciary and legislature; a divide that later played an instrumental role in 
the development of the Nation State Bill. Until 1992, the court operated without a working 
constitution81 until abruptly bestowing upon itself the power of judicial review. In addition to 
fueling the debate around the application of Israel's Jewish and democratic values, this move to 
judicial review unearthed the tension over the separation of powers between the legislative and 
judicial branches. Progressives have viewed the court as an essential institution that defends 
human rights and serves as check on the power of the executive. Conservatives, however, have 
called the court and then-Chief Justice Aharon Barak (who declared this "Constitutional 
Revolution") an "activist" in a pejorative sense. This resentment stems from his alleged 
usurpation of political power and violations of the separation of powers.82 
From where did the Supreme Court derive its power of judicial review? What are the 
substantive issues which have exacerbated the divide between the judiciary and legislature? This 
chapter examines how the court's repeated interpretation of Israel’s Basic Laws at the expense of 
Knesset laws motivated the conservative legislature to institutionalize their nationalist policies as 
a safeguard from the court's encroachment. I argue the Supreme Court obtained its power 
through a series of critical events and have wielded this power via judicial activism to oppose the 
Knesset in several decisive court cases. I will first survey and analyze the historical trajectory of 
the Supreme Court to understand the origins of its power and later use of judicial review and 
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activism. I will then examine two court cases which demonstrate the tensions between the court 
and Knesset over the separation of powers and Israel's identity. 
 
History of the Israeli Supreme Court and Lack of a Constitution, 1948 – 1992 
 On the eve of Israel's modern founding, the first government was founded not from the 
provisions of an official constitution, but rather was based solely on the principles explicitly 
outlined in the Declaration of Independence. The lack of constitution, however, caused heated 
debates among members of Knesset who disagreed about the form, content, or even need for a 
constitution. Shortly after, in 1950, the First Knesset issued what became known as the "Harari 
Decision." Named after its champion MK Yitzhak Harari, the Harari Decision called for the 
creation of a specific Knesset committee that was tasked with forming the constitution in "steps", 
chapter by chapter, until it was deemed "complete." Each chapter would be represented by a 
Basic Law, all of which together would be unified into a constitution. The lack of a constitution 
also distinguished the Supreme Court of Israel from its foreign counterparts in constitutional 
democracies, whose jobs usually involve interpreting their respective constitutions.  
 The first Basic Laws passed were more structural in content, originally excluding any 
ideological articles generally associated with a constitution. Between 1958 and 1991, the Knesset 
passed nine Basic Laws, which included outlining of the specific allocation of powers between 
the Knesset, Presidency, and Judiciary; granting the Bank of Israel the authority to mint 
currency; and assigning the Ministry of Defense the responsibility of upholding the operation of 
the military.83 Within the same period, the Knesset also passed several laws of "constitutional 
character"; but without roots in the judicial system, these laws were passed as ordinary 
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governmental legislation. Among these laws passed by the Knesset were the Equal Rights for 
Women law and the Law of Return;84 the latter guarantees the right of every Jew to immigrate 
and gain Israeli citizenship and has been a point of controversy since its inception. Since these 
two laws address such fundamental issues, one might wonder why the Knesset would not 
enshrine equal rights for women or the Law of Return as Basic Laws. The fact that the Knesset 
passed constitutional-like laws in addition to the Basic Laws undermines its commitment to 
creating a constitution "chapter by chapter" in accordance with the original plans put forth by 
Israel's founding government. Notably absent as well among the flurry of legislation passed 
within this forty-four-year time period was legislation protecting human rights, an integral part of 
a constitutional democracy.  
 The Supreme Court's proactive actions to protect human rights, even prior to the creation 
of an explicit bill of rights, provided the impetus for the court's future call for a "constitutional 
revolution." Many attempts over the years were made by governing coalitions to anchor a bill of 
rights as a Basic Law, but all came without success. Even as a political minority in the Knesset 
for most of Israel's history, Orthodox Jewish groups long opposed a bill of rights because of their 
concern that it would enable the court to exercise judicial review, a democratic mechanism, over 
religious doctrines and apply secular proceedings to religious-oriented issues such as marriage 
and Sabbath observance.85 To circumvent Knesset opposition to a tangible bill of rights, the court 
used a line of cases to integrate civil rights into the legal system through declarations. In one of 
the earliest of such cases, the court declared in their decision on Kol Ha'am v. Minister of 
Interior (1953):  
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The high value of the principle of ensuring free discussion and the investigation of truth 
constitutes a function of politico-social progress in every state which calls itself a 
democracy...the system of laws under which the political institutions in Israel have been 
established and function are witness to the first that this is indeed a state founded on 
democracy. Moreover, the matters set forth in the Declaration of Independence...mean 
that Israel is a freedom-loving State'.86 
Thus, Gideon Sapir marks 1992 the year in which Israel gained a Bill of Rights due to the court's 
elevation of human rights to constitutional status. 
The "soft legal principles," which included the freedom of speech and discovery of truth, 
became quasi-legal statutes that enjoyed freedom from restriction by government authorities. But 
the purpose of emphasizing basic rights in the Israeli legal system did not require a bill of rights 
since the court sought generally to define protected rights drawn from Israel's perceived status as 
a democracy. In addition to defining these rights through case verdicts, the court also developed 
an extensive system of jurisprudence that mimicked some of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
constitutional "tests," which are performed to ensure the of balancing basic rights such as 
freedom of speech and movement with other rights and interests such as national security.87  
Although the Israeli Supreme Court built a system of jurisprudence through court 
declarations and tests to balance rights and other interests, its only basis for judicial review until 
the 1990s involved intervention for failure to respect an "entrenched" clause of any Basic Law.88 
As exemplified in section 44 of Basic Law: The Knesset (and later Basic Law: Freedom of 
Occupation), an "entrenchment" clause states that the relevant law cannot be varied, suspended, 
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or made subject to emergency regulations and shall not be altered except by a majority of eighty 
members of the Knesset.89 As a result of this stipulation, the court stated that "when there is an 
explicit legal instruction of the Knesset that leaves no room for doubt, it must be followed, even 
if it is incompatible with the principles of the Declaration of Independence."90 The court later 
clarified that it would not even repeal primary legislation injurious to human rights.91 Thus, 
while the court had a vehicle for judicial review set in place for some time despite the lack of a 
bill of rights or constitution, it was substantially limited in its ability to assess and modify 
legislation even within the purview of the Basic Laws.  
 
The Passage of the 1992 Basic Laws and the "Constitutional Revolution"  
Until 1992, the court had considered Basic Laws to be of "constitutional status," even though 
the absence of a formal constitution and the resulting institutional, political, and legal 
frameworks lacked concrete safeguards for substantive values.92 Thereafter, with the passage of 
two new Basic Laws titled "Freedom of Occupation" and "Human Dignity and Liberty," the role 
of the Supreme Court changed dramatically; scholars identified these two laws as the Israeli 
equivalent to a bill of rights.93 The former, "Freedom of Occupation," guaranteed the right of 
every citizen or resident of the state to engage in any occupation, profession, or business. It was 
the first Basic Law that dealt with civil rights which were not specifically mentioned in existing 
human rights documents or other national documents.94 The latter, "Basic Law: Human Dignity 
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and Liberty," was passed by the Knesset two weeks later95 and outlines basic human rights 
recognized by the state and upheld by the Declaration of Independence, including (but not 
limited to) the right to life, body, property, liberty, privacy, and free movement in and out of the 
country.96 Both of these Basic Laws contain clauses allowing for the restriction or denial of their 
respective rights by means of law, since such a law must correspond to the values of the state, 
serve an appropriate purpose, and must only reach an extent that does not exceed what is 
required.97 This context provided a window for the Supreme Court to declare their ability for 
judicial review of legislation and thus, three years later, the Supreme Court declared its ability to 
hold Knesset legislation subject to scrutiny by the court based on the subjectivity and open 
interpretation of these clauses. 
 Thus, the passage of these two new Basic Laws ushered in a "mini-revolution" for the 
Israeli legal system. Three years after their initial passage, in his opinion on the case of Bank 
Mizrahi vs Minister of Finance, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Aharon Barack delivered 
sweeping statements declaring the court had the power to declare legislation unconstitutional if it 
was deemed incompatible with a Basic Law. In the case, Bank Mizrahi petitioned the court that 
the law granting protection to debtors against standard court proceedings and the write off of 
debt in certain circumstances, violated the bank's property rights based on section 3 of Basic 
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.98 Drawing heavily upon the reasoning of then-U.S. Chief 
Justice John Marshall in his opinion on Marbury v Madison, Justice Barack ruled that even 
though the new Basic Laws do not contain provisions for annulling any norm that does not meet 
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the requirements set forth therein, the court is nevertheless competent to declare such violating 
norms void.99 
 Divisions within the Knesset and controversy in Israel about the existence of a 
constitution boiled over during the declaration of the "Constitutional Revolution," reflecting the 
complex and unstable conditions surrounding the construction of an Israeli constitution.100 
Following the Bank Mizrahi decision, the Court extended its power of judicial review to include 
alleged infringement of rights not expressly outlined in the Basic Laws, justified by deriving 
judgment from the Human Dignity law. In addition, the court also applied its rulings 
retroactively to the nine Basic Laws passed prior to 1992, whose provisions did not include any 
form of protection or entrenchment clause.101 These moves were met with strong opposition from 
the Knesset, which already refused to grant the Court judicial review due to the intentional 
omission of many of these "derived rights" during debates over the drafting of the Basic Laws.  
The Supreme Court's constitutional revolution also deepened divisions between secular, 
Ashkenazi bourgeoisie ruling parties who were in favor of a stronger court and marginalized 
groups such as Israeli-Arabs, lower income religious groups, and recent Russian immigrants who 
believed the Ashkenazi political monopoly simply sought to enrich themselves. Having faced a 
continuous decline in power since the early 1980s, Ashkenazi groups saw the revolution as an 
opportunity to regain their threatened position and overcome growing popular backlash against 
their political hegemony.102 As a result of the 1996 election, however, many marginalized groups 
saw large gains in their political representation, which reinforced the opposition to the ruling 
Ashkenazi Jewish groups. Rabin and Gutfel argue that these emotional and often tempestuous 
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political struggles touched on urgent and substantial issues concerning the identity of Israel as 
liberal democracy and Jewish state103; a dynamic that is still a central discussion in Israeli 
politics and international forums today. The untimely nature of the "Constitutional Revolution," 
which enabled the Supreme Court to use its power of judicial review to take far more complex 
and problematic stances on this core dynamic,104 exacerbated a debate over Israel's identity and 
the separation of powers and prompted the right-wing government to seek ways in which to 
institutionalize its own policies. 
 
Tension over the Separation of Powers and Israel's Jewish Identity: Judicial Activism in 
the 21st Century 
Introduction 
 Some critics attribute the Nation State Bill to backlash from judicial activism and the rise 
of "Post-Zionism." There is no strict or impartial definition, but Kelman characterizes Post-
Zionism as a shift in the way Israel is viewed by its Jewish population from exclusivism to a 
focus on pluralism, equality, and partnership with the Palestinians.105 Although the ideas of Post-
Zionism may resonate with some Knesset members, like Israeli-Arab representatives, who 
advocate for secularizing Israel’s Jewish identity, I argue that this view did not significantly 
contribute to the development of the Nation State Bill. Rather, deep social tensions and the 
aforementioned conflict between the judiciary and legislature exacerbated the divisions leading 
to the passage of the bill.  
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The passage of the 1992 Basic Laws and Justice Barak's decision in the Bank Mizrahi 
case increased the powers of the court to check Knesset legislation has met resistance from many 
representatives. This divide, in addition to debates over democratic and Jewish values, has been a 
defining feature of the 21st century Israeli legal system and politics in terms of political and 
social tension in Israel. The core of this tension is encapsulated in two court decisions concerning 
the admittance and treatment of asylum seekers in Israel. The cases I will examine both concern 
the treatment of African asylum-seekers entering Israel. The reactionary responses from 
opponents to more liberal asylum policies, and to the court's role in general, have motivated right 
wing politicians to solidify its conservative policies such as in the Nation State Bill.  
 
The African Asylum-Seeker Cases (2013-2014) 
Between 2002 and 2014, over 60,000 individuals primarily from unstable regions of 
Sudan and Eritrea entered Israel via its land border with Egypt.106 Politicians believed that those 
who came from Sudan, a country considered an enemy of Israel, posed a danger to the Israeli 
public.107 According to d'Orsi and the Eitan opinion, the official position of Israeli authorities is 
that most Eritrean “infiltrators” are immigrants entering Israel for economic reasons,108 a 
position meant to squash sympathy for those entering the country. Thus, in the beginning, the 
government ordered these migrants be held in detained and held without trial. Although the 
government soon offered work visas to many of those entering the country, they were barred 
from claiming asylum status and therefore unable to gain the basic rights that come with being a 
recognized refugee. Starting in 2008, successive governments from then-Prime Minister Ehud 
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Olmert to current Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu had sought to amend the 1954 Law for 
the Prevention of Infiltration with the aim of allowing the state to systematically hold asylum 
seekers in administrative detention.109 The original law was passed to prevent the entry of 
Palestinian refugees following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and defines offenses committed by 
those crossing into Israeli territory. In January 2012, the Knesset—then under the leadership of 
Prime Minister Netanyahu—passed an amendment to the law allowing the government to 
imprison Eritrean asylum-seekers without trial for three years and Sudanese seekers 
indefinitely.110 
Despite previous successful efforts from the Knesset, Israeli non-profit groups turned to 
the Supreme Court and filed a petition against the amendment. In September 2013, the court 
decided unanimously in Adam v. The Knesset that the amended law disproportionately violated 
"infiltrators" right to liberty, as defined in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and 
demanded the immediate release of all detainees within 90 days.111 The court later invalidated 
the entire amendment, ruling it not possible to detach the article in question from the entire body 
of norms provided by the law.112 According to Justice E. Hayut's opinion, the case was 
monumental for the court due to its first decision that a Knesset law violated the constitutional 
right to liberty of aliens, even if they were illegally in the country.113 The ruling further 
emboldened the court to take action on Knesset legislation it deemed incompatible with the Basic 
Laws, a significant departure from the relative restraint it showed in the years immediately 
following the constitutional revolution.  
                                                   
109 Sabar and Tsurkov 11	
110 Sabar and Tsurkov 11 
111 Sabar and Tsurkov 11 
112 5 HCJ 7146/12 Adam v. The Knesset ¶ 150 (2013)  
113 D'Orsi, C. (2018). To Stay or to Leave? The Unsolved Dilemma of the Eritrean Asylum-Seekers in 
Israel. Harvard International Law Journal, 29, 83-125. Retrieved January 24, 2019. 
44 
 
Rather than follow through with the court's orders, however, the Knesset sought another 
amendment to bypass the ruling and continue detaining asylum-seekers, demonstrating the 
contentious position each branch of government had in a conflict rife with social tension. The 
2014 amendment ordered the detention of incoming migrants and migrants within Israel who 
renewed their visas for up to a year, where they would be transferred to a semi-open detention 
camp indefinitely or until they "agreed" to return to their country of origin.114 NGOs, again, 
sounded the alarms with the Supreme Court, culminating in the case Eitan—Israeli Immigration 
Policy Center v. The Israeli Government in September 2014. In addition to violating the right to 
liberty, the court ruled that the new amendment also violated the right to autonomy and free 
movement,115 specifically attacking the government's policy of offering asylum-seekers 
"voluntary" return, when the only alternative was detention.116 
 The significance of the Adam and Eitan decisions is two-fold: it marked the first time in 
history that the Supreme Court invalidated the same Knesset law twice117 and it signaled the 
court's stance on migrants, which ran contrary to narratives within certain parties of Knesset that 
the migrants were merely seeking economic opportunities. Although the "Constitutional 
Revolution" was momentous for first activating the power of judicial review, the court used it 
sparingly to invalidate Knesset legislation, only doing so on five occasions prior to 2009.118 For 
the court to rule the same law unconstitutional twice, despite Knesset attempts to circumvent the 
rulings by passing new amendments, signaled to the legislature a growing power of the judiciary 
that would encroach on their ability to pass and maintain legislation. The rulings also revealed a 
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stance that runs contrary to the widely-held beliefs on the intentions of the asylum seekers, 
asserted by the Knesset and other government officials to justify the deportations. In the Eitan 
case, however, Justice I. Amit highlighted that entering Israel would not constitute a preeminent 
“flight from persecution” alternative for Eritreans because Israel does not border Eritrea.119 After 
all, according to d'Orsi, many Eritreans fled their country of origin because they were subject to 
forced conscription into national service; a condition described by the UN Human Rights 
Council as analogous to slavery.120 Therefore, Justice Amit reasoned, Eritreans who decided to 
move to Israel were pushed more from considerations of economic character than from an 
effective need to be protected from persecution.121  
 
Conclusion 
From its steadfast decisions in the African asylum seeker cases, the Supreme Court's 
ability to "legislate from the bench" exacerbated a growing divide over the distribution of Jewish 
and democratic values, as well as the balance of powers between branches.  These tensions 
reflect lingering social divisions in Israel from its historical development without a physical 
constitution or defined framework for the Supreme Court to operate, resulting in Barak's 
"Constitutional Revolution." In the name of correcting the imbalance of these powers and values, 
a new movement among radical, right-wing politicians has emerged in recent years to combat 
what they see as a breach of the fundamental values of Israeli society. This movement, which I 
call the "Contemporary Constitutional Revolution" and explore in the concluding chapter, 
explains several solutions outlined by right-wing politicians to resurrect hardline beliefs of 
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conservative Israeli society including the curtailment of asylum seeking, and molding a stronger 
Jewish identity in Israel. The Supreme Court's trajectory significantly impacted the development 
of these policies and beliefs, spurring the right-wing government to seek ways to thwart the 
court's intrusion into legislative matters.  
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Chapter 4: The Rise of Right-Wing Politics in Israel 
Introduction 
A right-wing political ideology did not have a strong or consistent presence for most of 
Israel’s political history. Conservative, nationalist politicians, however, capitalized on several 
essential events which allowed them to appropriate public concerns over national security, 
establishing themselves as the authoritative voice for representing Israel's Jewish identity. But if 
Israel did not have a robust conservative political culture from its founding, from where did the 
right wing derive its power? What was their purpose for passing the Nation State Bill? This 
chapter demonstrates how right-wing intervention was possible due to a series of critical events, 
leading to their rise into mainstream Israeli politics, by analyzing the trajectory of right-wing 
politics in Israel. I argue that the actions of right-wing politicians, including the passing of the 
Nation State Bill, have been responses to the growing influence of the Israeli Supreme Court. 
Conservative politicians have sought to institutionalize their policies more firmly to safeguard 
them from an "intruding" court. 
The first section introduces the Israeli political arena and discusses the period of national 
unity governance, where a single, center-left coalition governed the country until its defeat by the 
first successful right-leaning coalition in 1977. The chapter then analyzes the collective rise of a 
steady, right-wing presence in Israeli politics beginning with the election of Benjamin Netanyahu 
in 1996. The 1996 election signaled a critical historical event because it was the first direct 
election of the Prime Minister, and the first time national security concerns played a definitive 
role in electoral politics. I then discuss the rapid rise and fall of the centrist Kadima party, the 
downfall of which allowed the right-wing to reorganize a governing coalition and solidified a 
conservative, nationalistic Jewish influence over domestic and foreign policy. Finally, I will 
48 
 
survey reactions from the Nation State Bill following its passage to demonstrate the tension 
between democratic and Jewish values which underlay both the support and criticism of the bill. 
 
National Unity Governance in Israel, 1948 – 1996  
 Since Israel's founding in 1948 until the late 1990's, its parliamentary body, the Knesset, 
was elected by the general public and the leader of the majority party became the Prime Minister, 
the de facto head of state. Although the election of the Prime Minister changed to a direct 
election in 1996, the entire country has remained a single voting, proportional constituency122 
where Knesset members are elected by, and therefore represent, all citizens in Israel and in 
which the leader of the majority party almost always becomes Prime Minister.123 According to 
Diskin, the new electoral system allowed voters to "split" their vote by supporting a major party 
candidate for Prime Minister while supporting smaller and more sectarian parties for the 
simultaneous Knesset election. The direct election was abandoned after the 1996 election,124 but 
it nonetheless facilitated the emergence of a fragmented, multi-party system where numerous 
political parties created specialized platforms to advocate on behalf of certain interest groups, 
which has generally resulted in a governing body constituting coalitions of various parties.125 
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From the period of independence until the switch to the new electoral system between 1948 
and 1977, Israel was governed by successive coalitions from the center-left Mapai party founded 
by the country's first and arguably most famous Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion. The party's 
rule was characterized by sweeping progressive reforms, including compulsory education, social 
welfare, increased exports, and the establishment of cultural institutions, integral for a nascent 
democracy. These reforms, however, also occurred during the period in which Israel fought 
several wars against its Arab neighbors including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.126 In 
particular, Israel was not prepared to respond to the simultaneous attacks launched by Egypt and 
Syria in 1973, which sparked the Yom Kippur War, and thus Israelis felt a heightened sense of 
insecurity about their geopolitical position in the region.127 Despite Israel's successes in the Six-
Day War and ultimately in the Yom Kippur War as well, terror attacks carried out by the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) throughout the 1970s caused Israelis to grow 
increasingly uneasy about national security and demand solutions to the violence. The center-left 
Mapai governing bloc was uprooted for the first time in Israel's history in 1977 by the 
conservative Likud party and a coalition of right-leaning groups campaigning on the promise of 
peace with its Arab neighbors. 
The original Likud bloc constituted right-wing and centrist parties, including two ultra-
Orthodox Jewish parties that still hold considerable influence in today's government. The 
coalition's first Prime Minister from 1977 to 1983,128 Menachem Begin, promised to follow the 
legacy of past prime ministers who sought peaceful solutions to the conflict. Under his rule, he 
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reached the first direct peace deal with Egypt, which was brokered by the U.S. and came to be 
known as the 1978 Camp David Accords, and his party successors ensured Israel's participation 
in the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, which was a conference co-chaired by the U.S. and 
Soviet Union that aimed to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Between 1977 and 1996, 
the government switched political leanings several times as the Likud and center-left Labor party 
(the successor of the Mapai) each enjoyed a majority rule at certain points. The political make-up 
of the government during the passing of the Nation State Bill has its roots in these coalitions 
because of the Likud's historic partnership with hard-right, religious parties, which was 
necessary for the Likud party's leader to form governing coalitions. These groups, such as the 
National Religious Party and Agudat Israel, played active roles in past government coalitions. 
They became major influencers for their strict interpretation of Judaism and strong belief in 
Israel as the homeland for Jews.  
The political system changed during the run up to the 1996 election for two reasons: the 
implementation of the new system to directly elect the Prime Minister and a change in the central 
issues for the candidates and constituents. While violence from the previous wars had 
characterized Israel's early history, more frequent attacks from extremists in the Palestinian 
territories brought security issues to the forefront of Israelis' concerns. According to the Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 283 citizens were killed in terrorist attacks between 1990 and 
1996,129 over 100 more than the entire prior decade. Following the Madrid Peace Conference, 
which represented an end to the primary violence of the First Intifada of Palestinian uprising and 
a transition to a formal political process, strings of suicide bombings were committed by Islamic 
extremists throughout the country in the 1990s. Despite the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords in 
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1993 and 1995, violence continued to spiral on both sides and both Palestinians and Jews took 
action to demonstrate their opposition to the peace process. For example, an extremist, right-
wing Jew assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 during a peace rally 
because he opposed the peace deal. These violent events dominated the political discourse 
surrounding the first direct election of the Prime Minister and changed how Israel saw its Jewish 
identity and responsibility for all its citizens along a Jew/non-Jew divide.  
 
The Election of 1996  
 The issues debated by the candidates for Prime Minister during the election of 1996 
resulted from a heightened concern for national security following the period of violence by 
extremists, creating a critical event in Israeli electoral history that facilitated the right-wing's rise 
into mainstream politics. It was a tense campaign season between acting Prime Minister Shimon 
Peres and Likud candidate Benyamin Netanyahu. The election focused virtually only on national 
security due to local and regional unrest. For example, a bus bombing in Jerusalem killed 45 
Israeli civilians and a failed Israeli military operation in Lebanon displaced 500,000 Lebanese 
civilians. The question was: what was the best way forward? Attempting to negotiate peace plans 
or more hardline stances? As Rabin's successor, Peres campaigned on continuing the peace 
process and upholding the Oslo Peace Accords. Buoyed by sympathy for Rabin, assassinated six 
months prior to the election, Peres enjoyed high polling numbers leading up to the election until 
the bus bombing and other attacks led Israelis to re-evaluate the effectiveness of the current 
peace process.130 
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 Capitalizing on fears from the Israeli public, Netanyahu argued that Peres' peace plan 
would compromise Israel's security and that only an assertive stance would make lasting peace 
possible. He campaigned for policies significantly different from those in the past, including the 
blocking of a Palestinian state, the slowdown of the peace process, construction of new Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank, and maintaining a grip on the disputed Golan Heights.131 The 
ability to "split" the vote, according to Diskin, led many voters to believe smaller political groups 
would become more empowered relative to the mainstream parties. He observed that the power 
of the two large parties indeed decreased considerably and the effective number of new parties 
increased. These parties and their media platforms which represented groups such as ultra-
religious Jews and recent Russian immigrants, tended strongly towards right-wing nationalist 
politics, were overwhelmingly Zionist-nationalist in character,132 and supported Netanyahu. 
Furthermore, the casualties suffered in Lebanon prompted many Israeli Arabs, who would have 
otherwise voted for Peres' substantial peace plan, to boycott the election.133    
 It was the first truly partisan race in Israeli history and the circumstances and 
appropriation of security fears led the right-wing to rise in mainstream Israeli politics. Netanyahu 
defeated Peres by a razor-thin margin of 50.49% to 49.51%, with 91.2% of Orthodox Jewish and 
West Bank settlers voting in his favor. Although Peres' Labor party won slightly more seats in 
the Knesset than Likud, Netanyahu secured a coalition of right-wing religious parties, many of 
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which made large gains in parliamentary representation, to form a government. He sought an 
agenda with an emphasis on "security first" and reciprocity from the Palestinians when it came to 
implementing the Oslo Accords.  
 Netanyahu departed from this traditional conservative view, however, when he signed the 
Hebron Protocol with PLO chairman and then-Palestinian President Yasser Arafat in January 
1997, conferring civil authority control over much of the West Bank to the Palestinian Authority. 
Despite his negotiations with Arafat and his policies on economic liberalization, Netanyahu was 
opposed by both the left and right-wing groups in his government and by the general public for 
his involvement in several scandals regarding charges of fraud and breach of trust.134 He was 
forced to call early elections in 1999, where he was ousted by Ehud Barak from the centrist One 
Israel Party. Barak's tenure as Prime Minister, however, was marred by a convoluted coalition of 
right, left, and centrist parties as well as corruption scandals and the onset of violence from the 
Second Intifada. These forced him to call early elections in 2001, which he lost.  
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The Collapse of the Kadima Party, 2009 
 The special election called by Prime Minister Barak in January 2001 saw the resurgence 
of the Likud party under the party's chairman Ariel Sharon, a conservative, nationalist minister 
who served in several cabinets and possessed an extensive military background. To provide a 
brief historical preview: although Sharon’s first few coalitions continued Netanyahu's right-wing 
political agenda, his ultimate decision to withdraw the military and Jewish settlers from the Gaza 
Strip alienated him from the Likud party and his traditional right-wing base in the Knesset. As a 
result, Sharon founded his own, more centrist, party Kadima (Hebrew for forward). However, 
Kadima’s success was short-lived; several key events led to its ultimate collapse and solidified 
Likud’s definitive place and right-wing influence in Israeli politics. I will now explore these 
critical historical junctures in greater depth.  
Similar to Netanyahu's strategy of blaming Peres' government for jeopardizing Israel's 
security, Sharon criticized his opponent Ehud Barak for failing to stem the Second Intifada's 
violence or reach a peace agreement. Sharon decisively defeated Barak in the 2001 elections and 
promptly set up a "national unity" government comprised of the Likud and Labor parties, 135 
which were on opposite sides of the center of the political spectrum. Shortly after taking office, 
Sharon approved Operation Defensive Shield in January 2002, a large-scale military operation 
carried out by the Israeli army to stop the stream of terrorist attacks emanating from the West 
Bank. The plan received widespread support in the new Knesset, and Sharon justified the move 
as retribution for a recent terror attack which killed 30 people in a hotel, saying "the Palestinians 
must be hit, and it must be very painful."136 He continued his pursuit of a hardline agenda as part 
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of his campaign promise to focus on security through "combatting terrorism." At this point in 
time, in and around 2001, Sharon criticized the opposition's efforts to disengage from Gaza137 
and approved the construction of a "security wall" between the West Bank and Israel shortly 
after the end of Operation Defensive Shield.138 Despite criticism that the wall violated 
Palestinian human rights by restricting movement, access to healthcare, and economic 
opportunities, 84% of Jewish Israelis approved of its construction139 and terror attacks fell 80 
percent almost instantly after the wall went up, according to Israel’s Foreign Ministry.140 The 
center-left Labor Party, which had originally joined the government, pulled out in October 2002 
following the implementation of Sharon's conservative policies and departure from Israel's 
longstanding policy of restraint, dissolving the governing majority bloc and forcing elections in 
January 2003. Sharon's resulting hard-right Likud coalition then made large parliamentary gains 
over Labor in the subsequent election and Sharon quickly re-formed his majority coalition to 
include right-wing, religious, and nationalist parties.  
Sharon found himself increasingly pressured to enact conservative policies; a point that 
seems paradoxical given Sharon’s own right-wing leanings and campaigning on a conservative 
agenda. Sharon's gains in the new election ensured the right-wing bloc's alignment increased, 
which according to Edward Carmines, increased the constraints within which politicians act on 
policies. He argues that newly formed party alignments become more stable over time as parties' 
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sources of electoral support in the population become more established.141 Despite his previously 
conservative stance on the peace process, Sharon called in December 2003 for the withdrawal of 
all Israeli forces and Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip. Sharon hoped that this "disengagement" 
would increase the security of Israeli residents, relieve pressure on the Israeli Defense Forces, 
and reduce friction between Israelis and Palestinians.142 However, his announcement faced fierce 
criticism from the right-wing and religious groups in his governing coalition. Netanyahu, 
appointed Foreign Minister in 2003, was the highest ranking Israeli official to resign in protest of 
what he saw as a lack of "reciprocal concessions by the Palestinians."143 The conservative 
National Union and National Religious Party also withdrew from the government in response. 
Feeling ostracized from the Likud party and his traditional support base in the Knesset, Sharon 
founded his own more centrist party Kadima.  
The logic behind the Kadima party's founding explains why it gained unprecedented support 
from the public. According to Carmines, the emergence of Kadima was predictable: rational 
politicians, in this case Sharon, will find other means to advance their political agendas if they 
expect their proposals to fall on deaf, if not hostile, ears.144 Instead of having his hands tied with 
strong Labor opposition now within his own coalition, Sharon decided to dissolve the 
government and create his own party, the centrist Kadima party, along with former Labor 
member and 1996 prime minister candidate Shimon Peres. Dubbed as an alternative to the right 
wing Likud and the social democratic Labor, Kadima enjoyed unprecedented popular support 
that other centrist parties in Israel had never garnered. Pulling from moderate conservatives and 
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like-minded liberals who supported disengagement from Gaza, the establishment of the Kadima 
party created a realignment of Israeli politics similar to the partisan election of 1996. After 
Sharon was incapacitated by a stroke in January 2006, Ehud Olmert replaced Sharon and 
officially became Prime Minster in the March 2006 elections, where Kadima won massive 
support and formed a center-left coalition with Labor and several other parties.  
Despite the success of the centrist Kadima party, corruption on the part of Olmert created 
internal opposition and a new party leader, Tzipi Livni, was elected. Following the collapse of 
Olmert's government, Livni failed to negotiate a new coalition with other parties within the six-
week deadline which triggered another round of early elections in February 2009. Although 
Livni’s Kadima won more votes outright, her challenger for Prime Minister, Netanyahu, secured 
a coalition with Likud’s traditional religious and right-wing allies. This marked the first time that 
the leader of the largest party (Kadima in this case) was not appointed to form the governing 
coalition, allowing Netanyahu to reclaim the role of Prime Minister since his first term ended in 
2001.  
A watershed moment, the collapse of the Kadima party presented another critical juncture for 
the ascension of right-wing politics in Israel. Although speculative, an interesting thought 
experiment to consider would be "what would have been" if Sharon did not suffer a stroke and 
instead continued to govern the country with widespread support. Instead, right-wing politics 
continued to reign and Benjamin Netanyahu has served 4 consecutive terms as prime minister of 
Israel. The values, core beliefs, and goals of the groups composing the conservative coalition are 
reflected in virtually all of the Nation State Bill's clauses, including the promotion of Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank, the imposition of Jewish symbols into the political sphere, and the 
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belief of sole Jewish autonomy in the land of Israel. Such ideas emphasize the vital role these 
groups and their history have played in the emergence of the bill. 
 
Aftermath: Support and Criticism Following the Nation State Bill's Passage 
Due to challenges from the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of the policies 
passed by the current and previous Knesset bodies, the Nation State Bill was a reaction from the 
right-wing to cement its policy preferences and concretize the role of Jewish values in all facets 
of Israel’s identity. Discourse both in support and against the Nation State Bill has revolved 
around the tension between Jewish and democratic values, specifically as it relates to their 
respective precedence in Israeli government and society. The bill directs the state to support 
Jewish settlements in the West Bank as a national value and encourages the state to promote their 
establishment and expansion. It also establishes "Jerusalem, complete and united, as the capital 
of Israel."145 These two issues have been at the core of the longstanding conflict between Israel 
and Palestine and have polarized the international community for decades.146 For example, the 
UN passed repeated resolutions condemning Israel for its allegedly illegal development of 
Jewish settlements and Jewish settlements also created tension between Israel and some of its 
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staunchest allies including the U.S.147 As a city holy to Jews, Muslims, and Christians,148 claims 
over Jerusalem have also been hotly contested, polarizing and ostracizing the Jewish diaspora.149  
The conflict between the Supreme Court and Knesset, which coincided with the rise of the 
right-wing political groups, resulted in a dilemma for Israel over how to balance its Jewish and 
democratic identities.150 Israeli Minister of Justice Ayelet Shaked, a member of the right-wing 
party New Right and proponent of the Nation State Bill, argues that there is no contradiction 
between the fact that Israel has full personal equality of citizenship while also extending the right 
to national self-determination only to the Jewish people.151 Critics of the bill, however, such as 
President of Israel Reuven Rivlin, see the bill as a definitive declaration in favor of Israel’s 
Jewish identity at the expense of its democratic one. Following the bill's passage, he stated his 
belief that every citizen of the state of Israel, Jew and non-Jew, is an equal citizen. To Rivlin, the 
individual must not only receive equality, but also feel that he or she is equal.152 His statements, I 
argue, refute the argument that the Nation State Bill is inconsequential because, as Rivlin  
suggests, the stipulations of the Nation State Bill make Israeli citizens of minority groups feel 
unequal. 
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With their public support of the bill, conservative lawmakers have demonstrated their desire 
to unilaterally institutionalize their nationalistic policies and safeguard them from the court's 
intrusion. Prime Minister Netanyahu along with the bill's proponents aim to guarantee the 
foundations of Israel's existence as they see it: the nation-state of the Jewish people.153 Avi 
Dichter, the MK who proposed the first draft of the bill in 2011, stated its purpose is to thwart 
any attempts to transform Israel to a country of all its citizens.154 Similarly, Netanyahu affirmed 
shortly after the bill was passed that Israel is the Jewish state, despite the efforts of those who 
have tried to undermine the principles of its existence.  
The conflict over Israel's identity also has its roots in various interpretations of the country's 
"founding spirit." Since its inception, Netanyahu has been an outspoken supporter of the Nation 
State Bill due to his belief that the bill represents the original ideas of Zionism. He expressed 
approval of how the bill enshrined Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people and had 
engraved in the stone of law "the country, the language, the anthem and the flag"155 of the Jewish 
people. He also referenced the "father of Zionism," Theodore Herzl, when speaking about the bill 
to evoke a sense of nostalgia. He claimed that 122 years after Herzl made his vision known, the 
Nation State Bill has determined the founding principle that Israel is the nation state of the 
Jewish people and respects the rights of all of its citizens.156 Along a similar thread, David 
Hazgony, executive director of the Israel Innovation Fund, argued that the bill reaffirms key 
ideas representing the crux of the Zionist project, alluding to the bill's clauses about national self-
determination for Jews and support for settlements in the West Bank.  
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Opponents of the Nation State Bill have emphasized its perceived encroachment of 
democratic values. Many American-Jewish and other diaspora groups argue it marginalizes 
Israel's minorities, who account for 21% of Israel's population.157 Jeremy Ben-Ami, president of 
the liberal American advocacy group, J-Street, said the Nation State Bill's sole purpose is to send 
a message to the Arab community and other minorities in Israel that they are not and never will 
be equal citizens.158 He claimed Netanyahu and his government are ignoring the words of the 
equality clause in Israel's Declaration of Independence, which grants complete equality of social 
and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race, or sex.159 Ami's comments 
reflect the concerns many liberal American Jews have that Israel is becoming less tolerant of 
minorities and even non-Orthodox Jews, who are becoming less affiliated with Judaism.160 
Especially in a country like the US, where the establishment of a state religion might seem 
abhorrent to many individuals, the ethno-religious aspects of Israel can be jarring to American 
Jews. Rather, many diaspora Jews see Israel more as a spiritual expression than as the political 
state, which is how most Israelis view it.161 
 
Conclusion 
Since the Supreme Court of Israel granted itself the power of judicial review and began 
overturning legislation on the basis of democratic values, the right-wing Knesset has sought 
ways to preserve its Jewish-nationalist policies. Two critical events altered the trajectory of the 
right-wing polity's development, which translated into more political power and the ability to 
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contest the court in a conflict over the supremacy of Jewish versus democratic values. Increased 
terror attacks and violence brought security concerns to the forefront of the Israeli electorate's 
mind, allowing conservative, nationalist politicians to co-opt these concerns and enter the 
mainstream political arena. Following a brief rule of centrist rule, several missteps by coalition 
politicians facilitated the solidification of the right wing.  
The issues addressed in the Nation State Bill evoke strong Jewish-nationalist sentiments, 
which reflect the platforms and policies adopted by successive right-wing governments of the 
past two decades. Knesset members and political actors close to Netanyahu, in addition to 
bypassing the court through the Nation State Bill, have pushed for a revolution of their own to 
combat what they see as a breach in the separation of powers. The leaders of this "Contemporary 
Constitutional Revolution" have called for the creation of additional Basic Laws, which seek to 
bestow power on the Knesset to override court decisions and re-define the balance between Israel 
as a democracy and a Jewish state. Since the passing of the Bill, the right-wing has continued to 
pursue its vision of shaping Israel's identity as a Jewish homeland.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Argument Summary 
 The previous chapters have laid out the tensions underlying the passage of the Nation 
State Bill, the issues in which these tensions have manifested, and the historical trajectories of 
the Supreme Court of Israel and the right-wing political establishment. Several key events during 
the development of these two institutions gave each branch increased power which escalated the 
conflict between Jewish and democratic values. The court has overturned key policies of the 
Knesset, which it viewed as incompatible with the democratic values of the state. The legislature, 
which prioritizes Jewish values, has thus sought ways to protect their policies from the activist 
judicial branch. The Nation State Bill is the result of such retribution by the legislative branch 
and contains nationalistic, Jewish-centered principles that the right-wing government believes 
Israel's identity should embody.  
This chapter situates my argument within two present-day cases that reveal the salience 
of the tensions and themes discussed in this paper. First, I demonstrate how a new conservative 
movement I call the "Contemporary Constitutional Revolution" has become the latest iteration of 
the right-wing Knesset's actions to shift Israel towards stronger Jewish values and away from 
democratic ones. Then, I will discuss the results of the parliamentary election in April 2019 and 
the potential for new conflict to arise within the conservative establishment in Israeli politics. I 
conclude with remarks about the future implications for my research.    
 
The "Contemporary Constitutional Revolution" 
This movement generated by two key conservative politicians demonstrates another form of 
the Knesset seeking to institutionalize its policies, emphasizing the continued relevance of the 
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conflict between the Supreme Court and the legislature. In September 2017, the Jerusalem Post 
reported that Education Minister Naftali Bennett and Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked had 
announced a "counter-revolution" in response to several recent decisions by the Supreme 
Court.162 The decisions in question include ones with policy implications for the removal of 
African asylum seekers, or "infiltrators" as Bennett called them, which contradict the right-wing 
stance. Bennett's and Shaked's motivation stemmed from the belief the court had overstepped its 
boundary, vis-à-vis the separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branches, and 
showed its alleged emphasis for democratic values over Jewish ones. Bennett lamented that in 
recent years the court has disqualified laws and government actions too easily,163 while Shaked 
has focused on the preservation of the Jewish majority as a value, something she believes the 
court must incorporate into rulings.164 As part of this new "Constitutional Revolution," the two 
have sought to pass new legislation which would pull the needle towards Jewish values in Israeli 
society and away from democratic ones.165  
 A significant element of Bennett and Shaked's new "revolution" centers around curtailing 
the power of the Supreme Court of Israel via two new proposed Basic Laws. The main ideas in 
this legislation include limiting the court to repealing laws only with the approval of a two-thirds 
majority of a nine-judge panel, permitting the Knesset to override the court's veto with a simple 
majority, and prohibiting the court from striking down a Basic Law or voiding a law on 
"procedural grounds" rather than on substance.166 These proposals reflect the steadfast ambition 
of the right-wing to supersede the court's authority, as it did with the Nation State Bill, and pass 
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laws with constitutional status that fit their idea of Israel. Through her cabinet position, Shaked 
has unveiled her plan to change the way judges on the Supreme Court are appointed in order to 
place more power in the hands of the legislature. In addition to the plan outlined by Bennett, 
Shaked’s plan would mandate that candidates undergo public hearings in front of a Knesset 
committee and allow government ministers to represent themselves in court, even in opposition 
to legal counsel opinion.167 These proposals purport to re-define the balance of power and pull 
the judicial branch towards the will of the Knesset. 
As the presiding Knesset member over the judicial system, Shaked has frequently 
criticized the Supreme Court when it has disputed with the Knesset's legislation on democratic 
grounds. Specifically, she has cited several cases decided by the court about the treatment of 
African asylum-seekers, ruling in favor of freeing detained migrants and extending the basic 
human rights guaranteed in the Basic Laws to non-resident aliens. She believes the courts’ 
rulings do not consider the preservation of the Jewish majority, a value she believes must be 
taken into deliberation.168 As a solution, Shaked has supported legislation forcing the 
incorporation of stronger Jewish principles in the court on numerous occasions. Such a proposal 
would direct the court to take into account the state’s Jewish character as a primary principle. In 
the case of the African asylum-seekers,169 these new mandates would affect decisions such as the 
length of detainment and visa policies for asylum seeker in general.  
A major point of contention between the right-wing coalition and the Supreme Court of 
Israel is over guidelines for drafting ultra-Orthodox Jews (haredim) into the Israeli army (IDF) 
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has resulted in verbal attacks on judiciary from the right. In September of 2018, the Supreme 
Court struck down a 2015 version of Israel’s conscription law which granted most yeshiva 
students, who come from haredi families and study in Orthodox seminaries, exemptions from 
service. The court imposed a year-long deadline for the Knesset to institute new guidelines 
allowing for ultra-Orthodox enlistment.170 Political disorganization ensued, and Prime Minister 
Netanyahu asked for a four-month extension after losing half of his coalition in the Knesset in 
November of 2018 following the withdrawal of an allied party during negotiations.171 The court, 
however, only granted another month to pass a new law. By December of 2018, Yair Lapid, the 
leader of the left-wing party Yesh Atid, announced he would not support the new guidelines in 
any form, prompting Prime Minister Netanyahu to dissolve the government and call for early 
elections that would likely warrant a further extension on passing a new conscription law. This 
tension provided impetus for the leaders of the new "Constitutional Revolution" to target the 
Supreme Court, blaming the judiciary for striking down the 2015 law and failing to provide 
adequate time to draft new legislation.   
 
The Election of 2019 
Motivated in part by a belief in the court's meddling role in the failure of the haredi draft bill 
and subsequent collapse of the government, Shaked and Bennett carried the ideas from their 
"revolution" into the election season to score political points among Netanyahu’s fractured 
coalition. After splitting from their previous political party, the pair announced in late December 
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2018 the formation of their own party called The New Right (HaYamin HeHadash). Rebuking 
the robust Orthodox influence in Netanyahu's Likud party, Shaked said the party would represent 
"full and equal partnership” between secular and the Orthodox Jews.172 Despite their break from 
Netanyahu's coalition and their belief that religious Zionists were “in his pocket," the new party 
nonetheless holds the same nationalist, conservative values which have pervaded Israeli politics 
for the last two decades. Bennett asserted “the New Right party is right-wing...in favor of the 
Land of Israel without compromise, against a Palestinian state, period,”173 and has vowed not to 
give up “a centimeter of the Land of Israel.”174 Shaked has repeatedly expressed concern about 
the weakening of the right-wing and the possibility of a Palestinian state, the latter of which her 
party vehemently opposes.175 
Despite the New Right's disappointing finish in the 2019, the tensions reflected in the party's 
platforms will continue to manifest in the future. Though the New Right did not have enough 
votes to pass the 3.25% threshold and gain at least one seat in the Knesset, issues with the 
campaign stemmed from organizational issues rather than from ideological disagreements. 
Haaretz called the campaign frenetic, unfocused, immature, and unable to hold its own against 
Netanyahu's machine.176 The emboldened Netanyahu, who won the election despite a strong 
opponent in retired general Benny Gantz from the Blue and White Party, and several indictments 
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stemming from corruption charges, has already signaled his hardening stance on issues where 
Jewish and democratic values conflict. Just three days before the election, he announced his 
pledge to annex the Jewish settlements in the West Bank,177 effectively thwarting any chance of 
a two-state solution. Though the New Right failed, there remains a strong conservative mindset 
among its rising leaders who are poised to succeed Netanyahu when he decides not to stand in 
future elections. Shaked, the current Justice Minister within Netanyahu's government, is popular 
in right-wing circles;178 her inclusion in the new government would bolster the right-wing's push 
to curtail the powers of the Supreme Court of Israel.   
 The "Contemporary Constitutional Revolution" and parliamentary election of 2019 also 
demonstrate the potential emergence of another conflict: between the Jewish secular and 
Orthodox right-wing. Shaked and Bennett's campaign demonstrated the emergence of a "hybrid 
right" party. This "hybrid right" party serves as a challenge to the old-school religiosity of the 
Likud, which has been characterized by a mix of traditional conservative policies and 
progressive elements, including equal representation of women. Nationalistic and Jewish-
oriented values remain a core part of the New Right's founders' platform, but Shaked and Bennett 
also shed their association with ultra-Orthodox rabbis and extreme pro-settlers179 to support their 
bids for higher leadership positions in the government.180 Likely at the expense of The New 
Right, however, at least four right-wing and ultra-Orthodox parties made gains in Knesset 
representation and pledged their support to form a governing coalition with the Likud.181 This 
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conflict will likely result in tension between the secular conservatives and the traditional, 
religious right-wing that has historically aligned with the right-wing coalition.  
 
Implications for the Future 
As I have explored in this thesis, the Nation State Bill originated from a deep-seated conflict 
between the Supreme Court of Israel and the right-wing, conservative Knesset majority coalition. 
The conflict is characterized by a dispute over the supremacy of Jewish values versus democratic 
values as well as Israel's relationship with its diaspora -- two high-profile issues in recent years 
due to several decisive court decisions which have shaped policy. As a result of the Supreme 
Court's "judicial activism" in favor of democratic values, the Knesset has attempted to 
institutionalized its rebuked policies via passing the Nation State Bill.  
 It is easy to point to the longstanding conflict between Israel and Palestine, and the 
alleged desire for Israel to assert complete sovereignty over its occupied territory, as the primary 
force behind the Nation State Bill. As I have demonstrated, however, there is no one conflict, 
event, politician, or figure to which we can attribute this consequential law. When assessing and 
predicting the impacts of legislative actions in Israel, we must consider factors such as the 
complex geopolitical situation in which Israel was founded, the manner in which its institutions 
have developed, and the current manifestations of Israeli tensions.  
Today's political landscape lends credence to a new wave of Jewish nationalism, guided 
by the now-codified principles of the Nation State Bill. As a relatively brief yet tumultuous 
electoral season ends, Israel's future leaders will undoubtedly be forced to confront the tensions 
laying beneath the surface of Israel's nation-state building project. The Nation State Bill is a 
testament of the extent to which those in power have sought to institutionalize their idea of 
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Israel's. It will be a battleground over the separation of powers within Israel's democracy and an 
indicator of where the nation will move in relation to democratic or Jewish values. As the 
Supreme Court of Israel mulls a decision on the bill in the face of proposed restrictions on the 
judiciary's power, Israelis and government leaders must reflect on the future they envision as the 
country moves deeper into religious, ethnic, and moral dilemmas.   
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